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STRATEGERY’S REFUGE 
CHRISTOPHER SEEDS∗ 
 Strategic decisions are entitled to deference under Strickland only if they were 
made on the basis of reasonable professional judgment after diligent investigation of 
the pertinent facts.  Anything less than that is “strategery,” not “strategy.” 
  —Stephen F. Smith1 
 [I]t falls most importantly to the trial attorney, as the composer . . . to minimize 
dissonance and enhance harmony. 
  —Scott. E. Sundby2 
 
By popular account, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on effective 
assistance of counsel in capital sentencing—aggressive critiques of 
counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence—initiate an 
era of improved oversight of the quality of legal representation in death 
penalty cases.  One would expect the new and improved jurisprudence to 
curb post hoc efforts by trial counsel to disguise incomplete trial 
preparation as a tactical decision, a practice that has long undercut the 
Strickland doctrine.  But the shelters for post hoc rationalizations—the 
refuges for “strategery”—remain.  Surveying decisions of the federal 
courts of appeals since the turn of the century, this Article illustrates two 
reasons why, and explores solutions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “distorting effects of hindsight”—this is how the United States 
Supreme Court, since Strickland v. Washington,3 has referred to the dangers 
 
∗ Adjunct Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  For valuable comments and 
suggestions, many thanks to Russell Stetler, John H. Blume, Stephen P. Garvey, Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, and the students of the capital punishment law and federal habeas corpus seminars 
at Cornell Law School.  Thanks also to the editorial staff of the Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology for helping to clarify what I consider to be some of the most important points 
herein. 
1 Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 
359 (2008). 
2 Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries 
Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (1997). 
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that inhere in postconviction critiques of trial counsel’s performance.  
Skepticism toward backward glances resonates because of the belief that 
counsel at trial is better positioned to exercise judgment in the moment than 
experienced litigators or members of the judiciary who reconstruct the 
circumstances years down the road.  But an inverse phenomenon, just as 
risky, holds sway today: rules and perspectives molded to outdated 
standards of the past govern the present.  For decades, this has hindered the 
legal doctrine of effective assistance of counsel in capital sentencing 
proceedings, and has resulted in the denial of relief to many defendants 
whose counsel performed below prevailing professional norms.  Just as 
hindsight ought not distort the past, the past ought not obscure the evolution 
to the present; lawyers should be held to standards of their time, not to the 
less exacting requirements of a bygone era.  This has and continues to be 
the case, however, with constitutional review of the effectiveness of counsel 
in capital sentencing trials. 
The beneficiaries of this time slip are underperforming trial counsel 
faced with ineffectiveness claims in collateral review.  The Supreme 
Court’s early ineffective assistance of counsel cases, Strickland v. 
Washington,4 Burger v. Kemp,5 and Darden v. Wainwright,6 found 
counsel’s representation constitutionally adequate, despite the fact that what 
jurors heard about the defendant in those cases was a paltry patchwork—a 
life story incoherent, inconsistent, and incomplete, seemingly a far cry from 
the individualized sentencing proceeding that the Court, not long before, 
found the Eighth Amendment mandates.  These early decisions, looking to 
performance standards in the late 1970s as guides, condoned limited 
investigations into the defendant’s life history and resulting failures to 
present mitigating evidence, on the ground that the evidence that counsel 
allegedly (in hindsight) should have pursued would not have helped and, 
indeed, may have harmed the defendant’s case for life.  For years, this 
precedent, accepting counsel’s failure to investigate or present life history 
mitigation where evidence was “double-edged,” facilitated post hoc 
attempts by counsel (and courts) to shelter subpar performance under the 
guise of tactical decisions.7  Professor Stephen Smith, borrowing a word 
 
3 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
4 Id. 
5 483 U.S. 776 (1987). 
6 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
7 The Supreme Court’s recognition of the concept of “double-edged” mitigating evidence 
is often linked to the discussion of the constitutionality of executing individuals with mental 
retardation in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 324, 328 (1989).  The Court first addressed 
the concept, however, two years earlier, in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794-795 (1987). 
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from the lexicon of the television show Saturday Night Live, has used the 
term “strategery” to describe these post hoc rationalizations.8 
The propagation and acceptance of post hoc rationalizations—the 
sheltering of “strategery”—since Strickland has occurred principally in two 
ways, each linked to one of the Strickland standard’s two parts.9  First, 
courts have excused incomplete investigations into factors relevant to 
sentencing as appropriate defense strategy.  Second, courts have tacitly 
condoned deficient preparation or presentation by finding that counsel’s 
failures, even if strategically unsound, did not materially impact the 
outcome.  Underlying each manoeuver is a belief that additional efforts by 
counsel would have merely yielded evidence more aggravating than 
mitigating—that counsel’s failure to investigate evidence of mental illness 
or childhood physical or sexual abuse, for example, was reasonable (or that 
counsel’s failure to present such evidence to explain a defendant’s 
background was not prejudicial) because the evidence would have been 
perceived by a jury to promote rather than mitigate a death sentence.  
Although the Strickland doctrine provides that no tactical decision by 
counsel is justifiable unless it is based on reasonably thorough 
investigation, this principle has long been underused as courts have failed to 
recognize the steady rise in the standards of capital defense practice. 
Since the turn of the century, however, the Supreme Court has taken 
steps to bring its jurisprudence up to date.  In three cases, Williams v. 
Taylor,10 Wiggins v. Smith,11 and Rompilla v. Beard,12 the Court found 
representation deficient that it would have accepted years earlier.  In each 
case, the Court reiterated that prevailing performance standards should 
guide assessments and stressed the need for thorough life history 
investigation as a precursor to any strategic decision-making.  To many, 
these cases mark the advent of an era of stronger Court oversight of the 
quality of representation and stronger policing of political incentives in 
death penalty cases.  Commentators have celebrated that the right to 
effective assistance of counsel in capital cases at last has teeth—something 
 
8 Smith, supra note 1, at 357 n.266.  As Smith explained, the skit satirized former 
President George W. Bush’s “reputation for mispronouncing words,” and mingled the terms 
“strategy” and “strategic” to arrive at “strategery.”  Smith used the term “strategery” to refer 
to “tactics that purport to be strategy but are anything but strategic.”  Id. 
9 The ineffective assistance of counsel standard established in Strickland requires a 
petitioner to establish that his attorney’s representation “fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,” 466 U.S. at 688, and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,”  id. 
at 694. 
10 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
11 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
12 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
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that, as death-sentenced defendant after death-sentenced defendant in the 
1980s and 1990s experienced, it sorely lacked.   
But this celebration is half-blind.  Behind the scenes of the Supreme 
Court’s nascent recognition of the need for attorneys in capital cases to 
investigate and present comprehensive life histories of their clients and the 
Court’s reaffirmation of the importance of prevailing professional norms, 
lurk remnants of the past.  Indeed, more than remnants.  The survey of 
decisions from federal courts of appeals conducted for this Article shows 
that, despite the Supreme Court’s aggressive critiques of counsel in 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, the shelters for post hoc rationalizations 
remain. 
The next three Parts of this Article set the lay of the land.  Part II 
begins with the Court’s early cases ruling on the performance of counsel in 
capital sentencing trials that took place in the late 1970s, shortly after the 
modern era of the death penalty began.  After tracing the growth of the 
concept of mitigation in capital defense practice, and the lag with which 
courts acknowledged that evolution, the discussion turns to the Court’s new 
precedent, which incorporates more demanding contemporary professional 
standards. 
Part III shows how the new precedent, while reinvigorating the use of 
prevailing professional norms as guides, nevertheless permits a refuge for 
post hoc rationalizations through its general acceptance of the old 
precedent.  There is a long-standing tension between the prevailing 
standards of practice and the old precedent that Wiggins and Rompilla left 
unresolved.  On one hand, much life-history material that is “double-edged” 
forms the essence of explaining who the defendant is, which is the purpose 
of the individualized sentencing proceeding in a capital case.  On the other 
hand, given the frequency with which a defendant’s future dangerousness is 
alleged as an aggravating factor in capital cases, concern about presenting 
mitigation, such as evidence of mental illness, that could turn against the 
client (or open the door to counterargument that would portray the client as 
a psychopath or otherwise support a propensity for violence) is perhaps 
warranted.13  The idea that avoiding or withholding evidence that is double-
edged may be the best road to a life sentence therefore arguably holds some 
force—and according to the old precedent, this is just the type of decision 
by counsel that distorting hindsight ought not overturn.  As the new cases 
seek to enforce full life-history investigations, the old precedent in certain 
circumstances allows something less.  In Wiggins and Rompilla, the Court 
 
13 Studies show that jurors’ feelings of sympathy for the defendant compete, often 
unsuccessfully, with commensurate, if not stronger, feelings of fear of the defendant.  See 
Stephen P. Garvey, The Emotional Economy of Capital Sentencing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 26, 
31, 64-67 (2000). 
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sought to distinguish, rather than overrule or explicitly limit, the old 
precedent.  While, as I will explain, a reasonable read of the new precedent 
relegates the old precedent to a small set of cases in which counsel 
substantially investigates and then seeks to limit additional investigation or 
the presentation of evidence (cases, in other words, in which counsel’s 
decisions are not post hoc anyway), some courts have used the gap between 
the cases to sanction abbreviated investigations of double-edged evidence 
and limited theories of mitigation.14   
Part IV surveys all federal courts of appeals’ decisions on sentencing 
ineffectiveness since the Court decided the first of the new trio, Williams v. 
Taylor,15 in April 2000.  This identifies a second, more deeply rooted 
reason for the continued shelter of strategery.  In addition to the apparent 
doctrinal gap discussed in Part III, a perceptual divide exists between 
decision-makers who see double-edged background evidence as mostly 
mitigating and those who see it as equally (or more) aggravating. A 
principal shelter of strategery, therefore, may be the divergent perceptions 
among judges of the value of explanatory mitigation, which in turn fuels 
weak readings of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla.16 
While a lot has changed in capital practice standards since the modern 
era of capital punishment began in the late 1970s, for many attorneys and 
courts, the question of what counsel should do with “double-edged” 
evidence in a capital sentencing trial is still up in the air.  As commentators 
pronounce that the Court has taken a stand against post hoc rationalizing,17 
any federal or state postconviction judge routinely reviewing capital trial 
counsel’s performance knows that loopholes remain.  Without addressing 
the bases of these gaps, the possibility that inadequate counsel will use the 
old precedent as cover, after the fact, for poor trial preparation endures.  
The refuges for post hoc rationalizations still stand.  
Part V explores how the divergent perceptions among judges and 
lawyers over the value of explanatory mitigation can be bridged.  The 
matter is complicated.  Post hoc rationalizations still find oases based on a 
 
14 See Welsh S. White, A Deadly Dilemma: Choices by Attorneys Representing 
“Innocent” Capital Defendants, 102 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2022 (2004) (recognizing that the 
disconnect between the new cases and the old posed a “deadly dilemma” for capital 
counsel).  By “limited theories of mitigation,” I refer to the type that rely on residual or 
lingering doubt, a mere mercy plea, or positive evidence about the client showing that he is a 
“good guy” who will not be dangerous in the years ahead. 
15 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
16 To help control for the many factors that affect the outcome in any individual case—
including, significantly, the quality of postconviction advocacy in pursuing and presenting 
information that trial counsel did not—Part IV studies divergent views (expressed in 
majority and dissenting opinions) on the same evidence. 
17 See Smith, supra note 1, at 294-336. 
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perceptual divide because assessment of ineffective assistance of counsel 
depends on a judge’s view of the persuasiveness of the mitigating evidence 
(or relative damage to the mitigation case that the evidence at issue would 
inflict).  If a judge is more likely to find mental health evidence 
aggravating, for example, he or she is more likely to assert that a reasonable 
attorney would see it as double-edged and choose not to investigate; a judge 
more inclined to find evidence of mental of health issues mitigating will 
emphasize the need for counsel to pursue the information.  A similar 
scenario plays out with prejudice: the difference between cumulative 
repetition and significant nuance depends in large part on how a court 
believes a jury would respond to evidence.  To some extent, this involves 
the unique personal experience and political views of each individual 
decision-maker, but not entirely. 
Social science studies of capital jurors’ attitudes toward mitigation also 
contribute.  A reliable ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence—in 
assessing both the reasonableness of counsel’s performance and its impact 
on the jury—must factor in what we know about juror understanding.  At 
present, however, the social science has reached a stalemate.  As the case of 
Wilson v. Sirmons (discussed in Part IV) highlights, existing studies—many 
based on the same juror interview data, now roughly ten years old—support 
both that jurors find explanatory mitigation mitigating and that they find it 
aggravating.  A takeaway point of Part V is that researchers should begin to 
ask a question left unanswered to this point: What were the qualities of the 
mitigation presentation that interviewed jurors heard? 
My hypothesis—rooted in the principles of the prevailing professional 
guidelines and supported by the existing studies and analysis regarding how 
jurors make decisions and what matters to them18—is that jurors who hear 
complete and coherent mitigation presentations are more likely to find 
double-edged explanatory life history evidence mitigating, not aggravating.  
Jurors respond to consistency and coherence, and those inclined by personal 
experience to vote for a life sentence, in particular, will respond to detail.  
In short, how jurors perceive explanatory mitigation may depend less on the 
 
18 On the Capital Jury Project generally, see William J. Bowers, The Capital Jury 
Project: Rationale, Design, and a Preview of Early Findings, 70 IND. L.J. 1043 (1995).  
Stephen P. Garvey’s article, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors 
Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1556-59 (1998), discusses jurors’ perceptions about the 
aggravating or mitigating nature of certain evidence.  Other analyses of capital jury decision-
making include: Valerie P. Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: 
LEGAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACHES 149, 161-63 (Kenneth C. Haas and James A. 
Inciardi eds., 1988); John H. Blume et al., Competent Capital Representation: The Necessity 
of Knowing and Heeding What Jurors Tell Us About Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1035, 
1039, 1051-53 (2008); Sundby, supra note 2, at 1178-79.  
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“double-edged” nature of the evidence, and more on how the evidence is 
presented.   
To the extent that research supports this hypothesis, it would help to 
bring the perceptual divide, which appears facially as an issue of personal 
or political difference, back to the legal question of counsel’s performance.  
If counsel does a thorough job, explanatory mitigation is nothing to shy 
away from, but rather fundamental to the case for life.  Presented in 
incomplete or incoherent form, however, some explanatory mitigation—
evidence of mental illness, for example—can be devastatingly aggravating.  
This distinction is significant for eradicating strategery because it renders 
the validity of counsel’s claims of judgment about certain evidence directly 
subject to the completeness of their investigative work and the coherence of 
their presentation to the jury. 
The Court took an important initial step in Williams, Wiggins, and 
Rompilla by recognizing the evolution of capital defense practice standards.  
An important next step is for the Court to explicitly state that the new 
precedent limits the once-broad application of Burger and Darden to cases 
already founded on a thorough investigation.  Another is for judges and 
attorneys to recognize, optimally with the aid of up-to-date social science 
research, the principles and knowledge that contemporary performance 
standards already integrate about juror understanding and communication.  
So informed, courts might take a different view of what makes for a 
reasonable decision of whether to investigate and present evidence, and 
could have a better perspective, with respect to prejudice, of what evidence 
is harmful or helpful.  These steps could align the Sixth Amendment 
ineffectiveness doctrine with the Eighth Amendment promise of a 
sentencing proceeding that provides a full picture of the capital defendant. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY: HOW EVOLVING PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS HAVE 
CHANGED THE MEANING OF STRICKLAND IN CAPITAL SENTENCING TRIALS 
A. OLD PRECEDENT: ASSESSING CAPITAL SENTENCING TRIALS FROM 
THE 1970S 
The modern era of the death penalty began in the summer of 1976, and 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Woodson v. North Carolina19 
played a formative role.  In Woodson, the Court rejected a North Carolina 
statute that made a death sentence mandatory for a conviction of first-
degree murder.  The statute’s principal flaw, the Court determined, was its 
“failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the 
character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition 
 
19 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
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upon him of a sentence of death.”20  In words now immortal to capital 
jurisprudence, the Court explained that “[a] process that accords no 
significance to relevant facets of the character and record of the individual 
offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from 
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of 
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind.”21  The North Carolina statute was such a process because it 
“treat[ed] all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely 
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated 
mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”22  This 
began the Court’s foray into mitigation, an evidentiary presentation at 
capital sentencing trials tailored to the background of the individual 
defendant, much more expansive than the presentence reports or allocutions 
common in non-capital criminal cases. 
When the Court decided Strickland v. Washington23 in 1984 the 
pressing question—whether the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution provides defendants charged with state crimes a right to 
effective representation by counsel and, if so, by what standard—was not 
unique to the death penalty.  David Washington argued that counsel who 
represented him at a death sentencing trial conducted in the winter of 1976 
was ineffective, but the capital nature of Washington’s claim, while adding 
an air of gravity, played a marginal role in the Court’s reasoning.24  
Strickland’s famous two-pronged test, which requires a showing of 
deficient performance by counsel and a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s failures, the result of the proceeding would have been different, 
rests on several general principles.  Among the most significant are that 
counsel’s tactical decisions are entitled to great deference,25 if based on 
 
20 Id. at 303. 
21 Id. at 304. 
22 Id. 
23 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
24 See id. at 686-87 (“A capital sentencing proceeding like the one involved in this 
case . . . is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards 
for decision . . . that counsel’s role in the proceeding is comparable to counsel’s role at 
trial—to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the 
standards governing decision.  For purposes of describing counsel’s duties, therefore, 
Florida’s capital sentencing proceeding need not be distinguished from an ordinary trial.”) 
(citations omitted). 
25 Id. at 689 (“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential. . . . 
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”). 
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“thorough” and “reasonable” investigations,26 and that “counsel’s function, 
as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial 
testing process work in the particular case.”27  The Court declined to set 
specific duties for counsel, instead endorsing a general “reasonable[ness] 
considering the circumstances” standard informed by “[p]revailing norms of 
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like.”28  
The Court then denied Washington relief, finding that the lawyer, who 
presented no mitigating evidence at sentencing, satisfied the Sixth 
Amendment by merely interviewing Washington and phoning his wife and 
mother.  In doing so, the Court sidestepped the notion of “death is different” 
that drove many of its early decisions in capital cases.29  The Court paid 
equally little attention to Eighth Amendment precedent under Woodson and 
the resulting ways in which defense counsel’s role in a death sentencing 
trial differs from and expands upon counsel’s traditional function.30 
For years, the biting criticism of Strickland was that the holding made 
effective counsel an illusory right, by announcing a test so lenient that no 
attorney could fail.31  Much of the futility that capital defendants 
 
26 Id. at 690-91 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts 
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after 
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 
professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.  In other words, counsel has 
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 
particular investigations unnecessary.”). 
27 Id. at 690. 
28 Id. at 688 (“Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association 
standards and the like, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2d ed. 1980) 
(“The Defense Function”), are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only 
guides.”). 
29 See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (holding a court must instruct the jury 
on available lesser included offenses in a capital trial); Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) 
(holding a state evidentiary rule could not apply to preclude mitigating evidence in a capital 
sentencing trial); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (finding due process violation 
where defendant was sentenced to death on the basis of a presentence report that he had no 
opportunity to review or explain). 
30 See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 715-716 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The majority suggests 
that, ‘[f]or purposes of describing counsel’s duties,’ a capital sentencing proceeding ‘need 
not be distinguished from an ordinary trial.’  I cannot agree. . . . Reliability in the imposition 
of the death sentence can be approximated only if the sentencer is fully informed of all 
possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine.) 
(quotations and citations omitted).  For early discussions of the unique duties of counsel in 
capital sentencing proceedings, see Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense in 
Capital Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV. 331 (1979), and Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: 
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 335-39 
(1983). 
31 See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and 
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1995).  
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experienced stems from two decisions issued shortly after Strickland that 
also considered capital trials from the late 1970s in which counsel failed to 
present any mitigating evidence.32  First, in Darden v. Wainwright,33 the 
Court found reasonable counsel’s decision to limit the scope of the 
mitigation on the ground that the evidence that the defendant argued 
counsel should have pursued and presented could have harmed more than 
helped the case for life.  Finding counsel’s preparation adequate,34 the Court 
offered several reasons why counsel’s choice to rely solely on a mercy plea 
was sound: (1) “[a]ny attempt to portray petitioner as a nonviolent man 
would have opened the door for the State to rebut with evidence of 
petitioner’s prior convictions”; (2) any attempt to portray the petitioner as 
incapable of committing the crime would have invited rebuttal with a 
psychiatric report indicating that he was a sociopath; and (3) any attempt to 
portray the petitioner as a family man would have been belied by his 
admission that “although still married, he was spending the weekend 
furlough with a girlfriend.”35  The Darden Court framed the issue as a 
fundamental tactical question of what to leave in and what to leave out, and 
found justified counsel’s decision not to present mitigating evidence that 
the State could rebut with a negative fact. 
The Court addressed sentencing ineffectiveness again a year later in 
Burger v. Kemp,36 which involved a capital trial from early 1978.  In 
preparation for trial, counsel spoke with the client’s mother, the 
codefendant, an attorney counsel hoped would serve as a character witness, 
 
Much criticism of Strickland is indirect, addressing the failure of state mechanisms for 
appointing qualified counsel for indigent defendants.  See Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges 
and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal 
Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805 (2000). 
32 Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). 
33 477 U.S at 185-187.  The case reached the Supreme Court after Strickland, but the trial 
took place over a year before Strickland, even before the Court introduced the concept of 
individualized sentencing in Woodson.  The principal issue in Darden was prosecutorial 
misconduct.  In the decision’s closing paragraph, the Court upheld trial counsel’s decision to 
present at sentencing no more than the client’s mercy plea. 
34 The Court majority stated, “a great deal of time and effort went into the defense.”  Id. 
at 185.  But the amount of time counsel spent working on the case and the extent of 
counsel’s investigation, even by the majority’s description, was slim.  See id. at 184-85 (“As 
an initial matter, petitioner contends that trial counsel devoted only the time between the 
close of the guilt phase of trial and the start of the penalty phase—approximately one-half 
hour—to preparing the case in mitigation.  That argument is without merit. . . . Counsel 
obtained a psychiatric report on petitioner, with an eye toward using it in mitigation during 
sentencing.  Counsel also learned in pretrial preparation that Mrs. Turman was opposed to 
the death penalty, and considered the possibility of putting her on the stand at the sentencing 
phase.”). 
35 Id. at 186. 
36 483 U.S. 776. 
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several of the client’s peers, and a psychologist whom counsel asked to 
determine the client’s competence to stand trial.37  This investigation, a step 
up from Strickland, uncovered evidence that Burger was abandoned and 
neglected as a child and started abusing drugs at a young age.  It also 
indicated a prior record of juvenile offenses and “violent tendencies,” which 
counsel perceived at odds with his strategy to present Burger as subject to 
domination and duress during the crime.38  Noting that counsel 
“interview[ed] all potential witnesses who had been called to his 
attention,”39 the Court held that counsel’s decision not to undertake further 
investigation was reasonable, because “an explanation of petitioner’s 
history would not have minimized the risk of the death penalty.”40 
Together, Burger, which approved of a decision to cut short 
background investigation, and Darden, which accepted the failure to 
present any mitigation, demand little.  Counsel need only investigate 
evidence immediately available.  Counsel may decline to pursue evidence 
of a defendant’s background that could potentially harm the jury’s 
perspective of the client.  Counsel may choose to focus solely on positive 
aspects of a defendant’s background and character, and need not explain 
more complex aspects of the client’s history, including evidence of mental 
illness or physical or sexual abuse, or drug abuse or poverty.  In fact, 
counsel could decide—as counsel did in Burger, Darden, and Strickland—
to present no mitigating evidence at all.  All three decisions endorsed 
evidentiary presentations and mitigation investigations that bypassed or 
ignored significant aspects of a defendant’s life. 
What these cases allow and what Woodson says the Eighth 
Amendment requires in capital sentencing do not match.41  As Justice 
Powell and Justice Blackmun emphasized in dissent in Burger, “mitigating 
evidence is not necessarily ‘good’” because the “[f]actors that mitigate an 
individual defendant’s moral culpability ste[m] from the diverse frailties of 
humankind.”42  It is important to keep in mind that Burger, Darden, and 
 
37 Id. at 790-91. 
38 Id. at 791-93 (describing the evidence as not “uniformly helpful”). 
39 Id. at 794-95. 
40 Id. at 795. 
41 Neither the Burger majority nor the Darden majority cited Woodson.  In contrast to 
Strickland, neither referred to “prevailing professional norms” or local, regional, or national 
standards of performance. 
42 Id. at 820-21 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing Woodson and noting that “Burger’s 
stunted intellectual and emotional growth and the details of his tragic childhood are far from 
‘good,’” and that “background information would have ‘indicated violence and stuff at an 
earlier [age],’” but that the information was mitigating nevertheless); see id. at 813 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)) 
(recognizing that the majority’s reasoning was inconsistent with the Court’s precedent 
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Strickland considered counsel’s performance under professional standards 
in effect immediately after Woodson, at the beginning of the modern death 
penalty era.  While methods for mitigation investigation and presentation 
were on the horizon, they were the exception when Darden was tried in 
1975, when Strickland was sentenced in 1976, and when Burger was 
resentenced in 1979.  The first American Bar Association guidelines for 
performance for death penalty counsel, discussed in the next section, were 
more than a decade away.  Nevertheless, the court’s early ineffectiveness 
precedent, which Burger epitomizes, planted a seed of conflict with 
Woodson’s individualized sentencing principle that would ripen as capital 
defense litigation matured. 
B. MITIGATION EVOLVES AS A PRACTICE AND A SCIENCE 
In the years after Woodson, the concept of individualized sentencing 
developed into a right to present, and a concurrent duty of juries and judges 
to consider and give effect to, “any aspect of a defendant’s character . . . 
that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”43  The 
Court defined the mitigation presentation as a vehicle for providing a 
sentencing judge or jury with the “fullest information possible concerning 
the defendant’s life.”44  In line with Woodson’s emphasis on “diverse 
frailties,” evidence of difficult and disadvantaged background, childhood 
abuse and neglect, mental illness, and any other factors that impacted the 
defendant’s life, negatively or positively, were critically important to the 
sentencer’s “moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant.”45 
As the Court’s view of individualized sentencing seasoned throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, developments in the sciences contributed to a view of 
mitigation as a broad-based exploration of cause and effect, “undermin[ing] 
the simplistic view that everything a person does past a certain point in his 
 
following Woodson).  Justice Powell was concerned that Burger’s culpability was reduced 
because he was a minor.  See id. at 823 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The Court had not yet 
interpreted evolving standards of decency to prohibit the execution of offenders who were 
juveniles at the time of the crime.  Burger was seventeen.  Id. at 818.  
43 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978); see id. at 605 (emphasizing “the 
uniqueness of the individual”). 
44 Id. at 603 (citations omitted); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); 
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).  See generally James Liebman, Less Is Better: 
Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1627 (2006) 
(discussing how Justice Stevens’s opinions follow the principle of the more information 
before the sentencer, the better).  The Court’s (and Justice Stevens’s) interest in providing 
the fullest information to the sentencer applied to aggravating factors as well.  See Zant v. 
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (allowing state to present evidence of non-statutory as well as 
statutory aggravating factors). 
45 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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life is the exclusive product of his free and autonomous choices.”46  The 
“science of mitigation” that developed in the decades after Woodson 
combined advances in social work, psychology, anthropology, and related 
fields with legal understanding of how best to communicate information to 
a sentencing judge or jury.47  As Craig Haney explained: 
Social histories, in this context, then, are not excuses, they are explanations.  An 
explanation does not necessarily dictate an outcome, not even a penalty trial outcome.  
Some explanations lead to life verdicts, and some do not.  But no jury can render 
justice in the absence of an explanation.  In each case, the goal is to place the 
defendant’s life in a larger social context and, in the final analysis, to reach 
conclusions about how someone who has had certain life experiences, been treated in 
particular ways, and experienced certain kinds of psychologically-important events 
has been shaped and influenced by them.48 
At times, this type of “explanatory” mitigating evidence central to life 
histories is understandably referred to as “classic” mitigation. 49 
Standards of defense practice evolved in step.50  In 1989, the American 
Bar Association issued the first guidelines exclusively for counsel 
defending death penalty cases, which focused on the unique demands of 
capital trials.51  Memorializing standards of care that prevailed among 
 
46 Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of 
Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 857 (2008). 
47 For more on the evolution of the Eighth Amendment concept of mitigation and 
concurrent developments in psychology and related disciplines, see generally id. at 845-64.  
The impact of developments in anthropology on mitigation theory and practice is discussed 
in Scharlette Holdman & Christopher Seeds, Cultural Competency in Capital Mitigation, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 883 (2008).  On the mitigation function generally, see Russell Stetler, The 
Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned Moral Response in Capital 
Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE  237 (2007-2008). 
48 Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social Histories and the Logic of 
Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 560-61 (1995). 
49 See Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n light of the abundance of 
classic mitigation evidence of which counsel was aware, his almost complete failure to 
investigate is startling.”); Haney, supra note 48, at 607 n.141 (noting “psychological 
evidence represents classic mitigation that, in the appropriate case, might make all the 
difference”). 
50 See Haney, supra note 46, at 857 (explaining that counsel became increasingly aware 
that a “more nuanced and comprehensive perspective helps to explain rather than excuse a 
capital defendant’s behavior”).  For a thoughtful discussion of the standard of care soon after 
Strickland, see Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The 
Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 341-42, 361. 
51 AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
deathpenalty/resources/docs/1989Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter 1989 GUIDELINES] (“Death 
Penalty Guidelines”).  The ABA amended the Guidelines in 2003, without changing the core 
substance.  AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF 
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003), available 
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capital defense attorneys in the 1980s, the Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases included 
provisions specifically directed to developing evidence against the death 
penalty in the individual case.  The principal themes of the Death Penalty 
Guidelines are completeness and coherence.  The Guidelines emphasize a 
prompt, thorough, multigenerational investigation into a client’s 
background and spotlight a wide range of information that counsel must 
investigate, including medical, family, social, educational, criminal, and 
employment histories.52  The Guidelines stress that a consistent theory 
should tie the guilt-or-innocence trial to the sentencing trial,53 and 
emphasize that mitigation presentations must possess an internal coherence, 
the goal being to “construct a persuasive narrative in support of the case for 
life, rather than to simply present a catalog of seemingly unrelated 
mitigating factors.”54 
The comprehensive life history narrative the Guidelines call for 
integrates positive aspects of a client’s background and character with 
explanatory mitigation.  Mitigation thus serves to “provide medical, 
psychological, sociological, cultural, or other insights into the client’s 
mental and/or emotional state and life history that may explain or lessen the 
client’s culpability for the underlying offense(s)” and to “give a favorable 
opinion as to the client’s capacity for rehabilitation, or adaptation to 
prison.”55  This emphasis on investigating explanatory mitigation56 
 
at http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/docs/2003Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter 2003 
GUIDELINES]; see Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2003) (“New ABA 
Guidelines adopted in 2003 simply explain in greater detail than the 1989 Guidelines the 
obligations of counsel . . . [but] do not depart in principle or concept from Strickland.”).  
More recently, the SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE 
TEAMS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008), further defined the 
function of mitigation in capital cases and the standard of care for developing the mitigation 
presentation in sentencing proceedings. 
52 See 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, guideline 10.7 cmt., at 1022-26 (“Because the 
sentencer in a capital case must consider in mitigation, ‘anything in the life of a defendant 
which might militate against the appropriateness of the death penalty for that defendant,’ 
‘penalty phase preparation requires extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into 
personal and family history.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
53 See id. guideline 10.10.1, at 1047-48 (“[T]rial counsel should formulate a defense 
theory . . . that will be effective in connection with both guilt and penalty, and should seek to 
minimize any inconsistencies.”). 
54 Id. guideline 10.11 cmt., at 1061. 
55 Id. guideline 10.11, at 1056.  The Guidelines offer as illustration that the testimony of 
family members and friends can “provide vivid first-hand accounts of the poverty and abuse 
that characterize the lives of many capital defendants” and can also “allow[] the jury to see 
[the defendant] in the context of his family, showing that they care about him, and providing 
examples of his capacity to behave in a caring, positive way.”  Id. guideline 10.11 cmt., at 
1062. 
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acknowledges how difficult it is to convince a juror to spare the life of a 
person convicted of aggravated murder solely on the argument that he or 
she is “nice” or “good.”  Mitigation is relevant not to excuse, therefore, but 
to explain.57 
What it meant to put together a mitigation case in the 1980s, and what 
it means today, far exceeds the standard of practice that was condoned 
when Burger, Darden, and Strickland were decided.58  Although a lack of 
qualified counsel and poor representation remain critical problems in the 
administration of the death penalty in the United States,59 higher standards 
put deficient performances in starker relief.60  Courts, however, were slow 
to acknowledge the rise in prevailing professional norms.  At century’s end, 
the Supreme Court had heard very few ineffective assistance cases, and in 
none did the Court find counsel to be ineffective at sentencing.61  
 
56 See id. guideline 4.1 cmt., at 956 (stating that “[c]ounsel must compile extensive 
historical data, as well as obtain a thorough physical and neurological examination.  
Diagnostic studies, neuropsychological testing, appropriate brain scans, blood tests or 
genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health specialists may also be 
necessary.”); id. guideline 10.7 cmt., at 1022 (stating that counsel must investigate “[f]amily 
and social history (including physical, sexual, or emotional abuse; family history of mental 
illness, cognitive impairments, substance abuse, or domestic violence; poverty, familial 
instability, neighborhood environment, and peer influence); other traumatic events such as 
exposure to criminal violence, the loss of a loved one, or a natural disaster; experiences of 
racism or other social or ethnic bias; cultural or religious influences; failures of government 
or social intervention”). 
57 Id. at 1060. 
58 Compare Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future: Charting the Crosscurrents of 
Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1947 (2006) 
(“The result of these decades’ worth of developments is a discernable improvement in the 
quality of representation.  The need for a lawyer to be specially trained in capital defense is 
now widely recognized and has fostered the emergence of a professional capital defense 
bar.”), with Ivan K. Fong, Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital 
Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461, 467 (1987) (critiquing the performance of capital 
sentencing counsel and collateral review of counsel’s performance shortly after Strickland). 
59 See generally Bright, supra note 31, at 1805; Jordan M. Steiker, Improving 
Representation in Capital Cases: Establishing the Right Baselines in Federal Habeas to 
Promote Structural Reform Within States, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2007).  Cf. Celestine 
Richards McConville, Protecting the Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postconviction 
Counsel: The Scope of the Constitutional Obligation to Monitor Counsel Performance, 66 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 521 (discussing problems with the performance of capital postconviction 
counsel). 
60 See White, supra note 14 (discussing contemporary standards that experienced capital 
defense counsel employ).  
61 Prior to the turn of the century, Burger, Darden, and Strickland were the only cases in 
which the Court directly applied the Strickland standard to capital counsel’s failure to 
investigate or present mitigating evidence.  In a number of cases, the Court denied certiorari 
on the issue.  See, e.g., Lawson v. Dixon, 510 U.S. 1171 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
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Strickland’s identification of the ABA Standards as guides seemed at best 
an empty promise, or worse, no longer the law.62  Beginning with Williams 
v. Taylor63 in April 2000, the Court took steps to change this. 
C. NEW PRECEDENT: ASSESSING CAPITAL REPRESENTATION BY 
CONTEMPORARY STANDARDS 
A trio of cases this century (Williams (2000), Wiggins (2003), and 
Rompilla (2005)) mark the Court’s recognition that capital attorneys 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s were often judged at a standard of 
performance lower, sometimes much lower, than prevailing professional 
norms and, similarly, that the prejudicial impact of counsel’s failures on 
sentencing proceedings were often underestimated.  In each of these cases, 
the Court determined that representation that likely would have passed the 
bar in the late 1970s no longer did.  In doing so, the Court named the ABA 
Death Penalty Guidelines as the yardstick. 
1. A New Century, New Precedent 
Williams was the first Sixth Amendment decision by the Court to 
appreciate the central role that explanatory mitigation plays in capital 
sentencing proceedings.  The Court critiqued counsel’s curt investigation, 
which began a week before trial and consisted of several interviews with 
peers and a consultation with an under-prepared psychiatrist who had 
received no social service, prison, or juvenile criminal records.  The Court 
faulted counsel for not discovering and presenting evidence that Williams 
had borderline mental retardation and had lived through a “nightmarish 
childhood,” during which he was subjected to severe physical abuse and 
decrepit living conditions, before his parents were imprisoned for criminal 
neglect.64  Trial counsel’s alleged strategy was to capitalize on the fact that 
Williams turned himself in and expressed genuine remorse for the crime by 
portraying Williams as a “nice boy.”65  For this, counsel offered the 
testimony of Williams’s mother and two neighbors (one whom counsel 
noticed in the courtroom and called impromptu to testify), coupled with a 
taped excerpt from the psychiatrist stating that before another robbery 
offense Williams removed the bullets from his gun.66  This paltry evidence 
could not compete with the prosecution’s proof of prior arsons, robberies, 
 
62 See John Jeffries & Williams Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in 
Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 682 (1990) (“In practice, the constitutional 
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel approximates gross negligence.”). 
63 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
64 Id. at 369-71, 395 & n.19. 
65 Id. at 398. 
66 Id. at 369. 
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and assaults committed by Williams or the argument that Williams posed a 
future danger to society.67  Further, belying counsel’s stated theory, counsel 
overlooked evidence that in prison Williams had returned a guard’s wallet, 
helped to break up a drug ring, and had generally adjusted well.68  Trial 
counsel’s postconviction testimony about Williams’s 1986 death sentence 
was archetypal of the post hoc rationalizations that passed as adequate ten 
years earlier. 
By the time Williams’s case reached the Supreme Court, however, the 
inadequacy of counsel’s investigation was “barely disputed.”69  Focused on 
the prejudice prong,70 the Court acknowledged that not all of the evidence 
offered in postconviction “was favorable to Williams.”71  Yet the Court 
found that, while the evidence “coupled with the prison records and guard 
testimony, may not have overcome a finding of future dangerousness, the 
graphic description of Williams’ childhood, filled with abuse and privation, 
or the reality that he was ‘borderline mentally retarded,’ might well have 
influenced the jury’s appraisal of his moral culpability.”72  The state court 
had applied Strickland unreasonably by failing to appreciate that 
“[m]itigating evidence unrelated to dangerousness may alter the jury’s 
selection of penalty, even if it does not undermine or rebut the prosecution’s 
death-eligibility case.”73  The opinion did not mention Burger or Darden, 
and its emphasis on the value of explanatory mitigating evidence, which cut 
against the old precedent, was strikingly new. 
Less than three years later, the Court considered similar circumstances 
surrounding a death sentence returned in Maryland in 1989.74  Counsel’s 
preparation consisted of interviewing several family members, obtaining 
social service and probation records (but no more), and consulting a 
psychologist who found that the defendant, Kevin Wiggins, had a 
borderline IQ and a personality disorder.75  In postconviction proceedings, 
trial counsel said that they knew of evidence of “severe privation and abuse 
in the first six years of [Wiggins’s] life while in the custody of his 
alcoholic, absentee mother[,] [and] physical torment, sexual molestation, 
 
67 Id. at 368-69. 
68 Id. at 396. 
69 Id. at 395. 
70 Id. at 396-98; see also id. at 418-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting on prejudice prong 
only). 
71 Id. at 396 (majority opinion). 
72 Id. at 398.  
73 Id. at 398. 
74 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
75 Id. at 524-25. 
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and repeated rape during his subsequent years in foster care.”76  However, 
counsel claimed that they had worried the evidence of abuse and intellectual 
disability would be perceived as aggravating and, thus, would undercut 
their argument that the client lacked direct responsibility for the crime.77  At 
sentencing, counsel had proffered the psychologist’s report, which showed 
limited intellectual capacity and Wiggins’s childlike character; but neither 
finding shed much light on the “powerful mitigating narrative”78 of 
Wiggins’s personal history.79  Noting that counsel promised the jury they 
would hear evidence of Wiggins’s “difficult life,”80 the Court perceived a 
post hoc rationalization for performance that was “neither consistent with 
the professional standards that prevailed in 1989, nor reasonable in light of 
the evidence counsel uncovered in the social services records.”81  Picking 
up where Williams left off, Wiggins breathed new life into the principle that 
“‘strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are 
reasonable’ only to the extent that ‘reasonable professional judgments 
support the limitations on investigation.’”82  What Williams suggested about 
the importance of a thorough mitigation investigation into explanatory as 
well as positive-character evidence, Wiggins made explicit, and linked this 
to prevailing national and local performance norms, which it emphasized—
as Strickland had—as guides. 
The third panel of the triptych is Rompilla v. Beard,83 in which the 
Court reviewed a Pennsylvania death sentence from 1989.  Counsel’s 
preparation surpassed that in Williams and Wiggins.  Counsel interviewed 
the defendant’s family members and consulted three mental health experts.  
After conversations with the client, his family, and the mental health 
experts, however, counsel decided that mitigation would have little return84 
 
76 Id. at 535. 
77 Brief for Respondents at 2, 8-9, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 02-311), 
2003 WL 543903.  This, counsel argued, motivated a motion for a bifurcated sentencing 
proceeding in which the State would prove the direct-responsibility aggravating factor first, 
and mitigation would follow only if the jury found the aggravating factor.  Id.  The trial court 
denied the bifurcation motion, however, and the jury found the aggravating factor, 
prompting the need for mitigation.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 515. 
78 Id. at 537.  The postconviction evidence also showed that Wiggins had borderline 
mental retardation.  Id. at 535. 
79 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516. 
80 Id. at 526. 
81 Id. at 526-27, 534; see also id. at 524 (citing 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, 
guideline 11.4.1(C)) (stating that investigations into mitigating evidence “‘should comprise 
efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any 
aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor’”). 
82 Id. at 512 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984)). 
83 545 U.S. 374 (2005).  
84 Id.  
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and at sentencing presented only alibi evidence to support a theory of 
residual doubt.85  The Court noted at the outset, “[t]his [wa]s not a case in 
which defense counsel simply ignored their obligation to find mitigating 
evidence.”86  Nevertheless, counsel’s investigation of Rompilla’s school, 
medical, and juvenile records was incomplete.  Most significant, counsel 
failed to obtain Rompilla’s prior conviction file,87 which contained evidence 
pointing to organic brain damage, borderline mental retardation, 
schizophrenia, and the fact that Rompilla’s father was an alcoholic who 
physically and verbally abused him.88  “The accumulated entries,” the Court 
found, “destroyed the benign conception of Rompilla’s upbringing and 
mental capacity that defense counsel had formed from talking with 
Rompilla himself and some of his family members, and from the reports of 
the mental health experts.”89 “[T]aken as whole,” the Court concluded, this 
evidence would have led a reasonable attorney to present an entirely 
different mitigation case.90  Rompilla affirms the importance of explanatory 
mitigation and highlights counsel’s duty to pursue all reasonable leads 
before limiting mitigation theories. 
2. Initial Critical Acclaim 
Commentators and practitioners have heralded these three decisions as 
a welcome, if overdue, response to the “impenetrable Strickland standard” 
and as an effort by the Court “to effectuate real improvement in the 
representation of capital defendants.”91  Those most optimistic see Williams, 
 
85 Id. at 378.  The defendant’s son also testified that he loved his father and hoped to visit 
him in prison.  Id. 
86 Id. at 381. 
87 Id. at 383-84, 387 (citing 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-4.1 (2d ed. 
1982 Supp.).  The Court also cited Guideline 11.4.1.D of the 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 
51, and Guideline 10.7 commentary of the 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 51.  Rompilla, 545 
U.S. at 387 n.7.  
88 Id. at 392-93.  This included an incident in which the father locked Rompilla “in a 
small wire mesh dog pen that was filthy and excrement filled” and forced him to “attend 
school in rags.”  Id. 
89 Id. at 392. 
90 Id. at 386.  Some courts have expressed confusion over the Court’s apparent failure to 
weigh the evidence in aggravation in assessing prejudice in Rompilla.  Pinholster v. Ayers, 
525 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, J., concurring in reversal of district court grant of 
relief on sentencing ineffectiveness) (expressing uncertainty “whether Rompilla v. Beard still 
allows us to ‘reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating 
evidence,’ when counsel fails to uncover mitigating evidence.  After all, counsel failed to 
uncover mitigating evidence in Rompilla, and the Supreme Court didn’t seem to address the 
aggravating evidence in assessing prejudice.”) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 
(2003)). 
91 John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: Williams 
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines 
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Wiggins, and Rompilla as initiating an era of greater Court oversight,92 
attuned to a more demanding standard that shows less deference to 
counsel’s decisions and adheres more closely to prevailing professional 
norms.93 
The decisions—which explicitly adhere to Strickland—do not change 
the law, but they do show the Court finally taking note that the performance 
bar has been raised and that standards of capital representation have 
evolved.94  Reinvigorating a doctrine that slept for many years, they impose 
 
Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 129 (2007); see 
also id. at 153 (“In essence, the Supreme Court realized that Strickland was part of the 
problem, not a solution to poor representation in capital cases.  Capital defendants were 
frequently being represented by ineffective counsel, and the high threshold of the Strickland 
standard tied the hands of appellate courts from doing much about the problem.”). 
92 See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 
283, 383 (2008); cf. Sundby, supra note 58, at 1946 (“Although the Sixth Amendment 
standard for competent representation in capital cases remains far below what research has 
shown is required to mount a successful ‘case for life,’ the Court finally appears to be 
patrolling at least the outermost parameters of ineffective representation.”). 
93 See, e.g., Whitney Cawley, Note, Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents 
the Court’s Increasing Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in 
Capital Cases, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 1139, 1185 (2007) (“In recent decisions regarding capital 
defendants’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court has shown a tendency 
toward modifying Strickland and imposing stricter standards on capital defense 
lawyers . . . .”); Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. 
Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 77, 104 
(2007) (arguing the Court “tightened counsel’s duty to investigate, not by changing the test 
formulated in Strickland, but by using the ABA standards as an evaluative tool rather than 
mere ‘guidelines’”).  Blume and Neumann suggest that the Court has essentially adopted a 
checklist approach akin to that favored by Judge Bazelon of the Circuit Court for the District 
of Columbia before Strickland.  Blume & Neumann, supra note 91, at 143, 152.  This 
argument finds some support in the Rompilla dissent, 545 U.S. at 402 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“One of the primary reasons this Court has rejected a checklist approach to 
effective assistance of counsel is that each new requirement risks distracting attorneys from 
the real objective of providing vigorous advocacy as dictated by the facts and circumstances 
in the particular case.  The Court’s rigid requirement that counsel always review the case 
files of convictions the prosecution seeks to use at trial will be just such a distraction.”), but 
not in the language of the Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla majority opinions.  For a case 
applying the Death Penalty Guidelines in a checklist-like manner, see Summerlin v. Shriro, 
427 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (granting relief on sentencing ineffectiveness). 
94 White, supra note 14, at 2017 (“Although Wiggins simply applied Strickland’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel test, the Court’s analysis indicates that its view of the 
standard of care required by an attorney representing a capital defendant may have evolved 
since Strickland was decided in 1984.”); accord Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, Comment, 
Wiggins v. Smith: The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Standard Applied Twenty Years 
After Strickland, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 769 (2004) (“Although there was concern 
that Wiggins would alter the Strickland standard, in actuality it reaffirmed that Strickland 
was the standard, and demonstrated that attorney conduct would be examined on an 
objective basis, following the two prongs established in Strickland.”). 
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a duty upon counsel to conduct a comprehensive life history investigation 
along the lines set forth in the Death Penalty Guidelines.95  Failure to 
uncover and present mitigating evidence is no longer “justif[iable] as a 
tactical decision” unless counsel “fulfill[s] their obligation to conduct a 
thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”96  This includes a 
duty to pursue leads (“red flags”) indicating explanatory mitigation, not just 
positive aspects of the defendant’s background or character.97  The results 
in these cases are all the more striking because the Court reversed the state 
court judgments under strict habeas standards of review.98  As one writer 
put it: 
the Court finally provided death penalty lawyers with a clear mandate to vigorously 
investigate all potentially relevant aspects of their client’s social history [and,] [o]nce 
having collected and assembled these facts into a mitigating narrative, attorneys were 
now on notice to present that more comprehensive and balanced view to the 
sentencing jury.99 
But what of Burger and Darden? 
 
95 Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Wiggins case now 
stands for the proposition that the ABA standards for counsel in death penalty cases provide 
the guiding rules and standards to be used in defining the ‘prevailing professional norms’ in 
ineffective assistance cases.  This principle adds clarity, detail and content to the more 
generalized and indefinite 20-year-old language of Strickland . . . .”). 
96 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 396 (2000)). 
97 Rompilla 545 U.S. at 389, 391 n.8; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 527; see Mason v. Mitchell, 
543 F.3d 766, 768 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We hold that trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to interview Mason’s family members and investigate the obvious red 
flags contained in state records suggesting that Mason’s childhood was pervaded by violence 
and exposure to drugs in the home from an early age.”).  As the Third Circuit has stated, two 
principles resound: first, although counsel is not required “‘to investigate every conceivable 
line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant 
at sentencing[,]’” they are in no position to decide, as a tactical matter, not to present 
mitigating evidence or not to investigate further just because they have some information 
about their client’s background; second, “the presence of certain elements in capital 
defendant’s background, such as family history of alcoholism, abuse, and emotional 
problems, triggers a duty to conduct further inquiry before choosing to cease investigating.”  
Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533) 
(remanding for evidentiary hearing on sentencing ineffectiveness).   
98 In each of the cases, governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the Court was constricted to grant relief only if the state court 
judgment unreasonably applied clearly established federal law (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)) or 
unreasonably determined the facts (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). 
99 Haney, supra note 46, at 855. 
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III. STRATEGERY’S REFUGE 
The brief history recounted above and the aspects of Wiggins that most 
have grasped do not tell the whole story.  As the “science” of mitigation has 
developed over the past three decades, so has the scope of aggravating 
evidence.  The Court has allowed an expansive range of evidence that 
weighs in favor of a death sentence.100  The most significant development is 
the concept of future dangerousness, which refers to the likelihood that a 
prisoner will commit violent crime again.101  For reasons rooted in fear 
more than rationality, future dangerousness is constantly on the minds of 
capital jurors.  Even when the sentencing alternative to a death sentence is 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, and although many 
capital defendants adjust better in a structured prison environment than in 
society, jurors nevertheless routinely ponder the unlikely event of a 
defendant’s escape or early release.102 
The science of mitigation has responded to jurors’ fears of 
dangerousness with information about the defendant’s background in the 
form of risk factors, which aid in predicting the likelihood that the 
defendant will pose a future problem.103  But this does not extinguish jurors’ 
concerns.104  Accordingly, capital defense counsel remain wary of evidence 
that could potentially support a future dangerousness finding.  Often this is 
mitigating evidence, however, of the classic type: mental illness, brain 
damage, a history of sexual or physical abuse, neglect, or drug or alcohol 
abuse.  This evidence lessens the defendant’s culpability and humanizes the 
defendant by explaining his or her frailties, but it also may suggest a 
potential for violent conduct in the future.105 
 
100 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (upholding state’s use of non-statutory 
aggravating factors); see also Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (holding state 
statute need not specify whether jurors should consider relevant but ambiguous factors, such 
as age, as mitigating or aggravating). 
101 See generally John H. Blume et al., Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases: Always 
“At Issue,” 86 CORNELL L. REV. 397 (2001).  See also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 
(1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “two out of three” predictions of future 
dangerousness are wrong (emphasis omitted)). 
102 Id. at 404-05. 
103 See Mark D. Cunningham et al., Assertions of “Future Dangerousness” at Federal 
Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison Misconduct and Violence, 
32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46 (2008).  As the authors explain, “future dangerousness” “is a . . . 
descriptor that arguably applies to virtually all capital offenders, if not almost all violent 
felons, and thus does little to individualize the application of the death penalty.”  Id. at 47 
n.2. 
104 Blume et al., supra note 101, at 397. 
105 See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 553 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The omnipresence of future dangerousness explains the appeal of the 
Burger principle under which counsel may reasonably decide not to fully 
investigate or present explanatory mitigation and choose instead a “good 
guy” or residual doubt defense.  It helps to explain why courts before 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, expecting no more from counsel than 
Burger required, liberally upheld counsel’s representation. The Burger 
principle does not excuse incomplete work by defense counsel, but under 
the cover of the old precedent counsel could explain away an incomplete or 
inconsistent defense as an intentional decision to avoid certain explanatory 
background evidence.106 
There are two distinct yet highly related mechanisms by which post 
hoc rationalizations—strategery—in the capital sentencing context have 
been condoned.  On Strickland’s performance prong, courts falling for 
strategery have excused abbreviated investigations that did not otherwise 
meet the thorough demands of professional standards as tactical decisions 
meant to avoid jury findings of future dangerousness.107  Second, on 
Strickland’s prejudice prong, some courts have made expansive use of 
“double-edged” doctrine to forgive counsel’s failures to investigate or 
present explanatory mitigation.108  These mechanisms are similar in that 
both turn on the perceived mitigating value of the evidence that defense 
counsel failed to investigate and present; but whereas the first identifies 
 
106 Professor Stephen Smith refers to such post hoc rationalizations as “strategery.”  
Smith, supra note 1, at 357 n.266. 
107 See infra IV.A.1 (discussing West v. Bell, 550 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
108 John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Fourth Circuit’s “Double-Edged Sword”: 
Eviscerating the Right to Present Mitigating Evidence and Beheading the Right to the 
Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1480, 1489, 1502-03.  In 1999, Blume and Johnson 
noted that the Fourth Circuit had “invoked [the double-edge] rationale in dismissing 
evidence of a defendant’s organic brain dysfunction, evidence of a defendant’s abuse as a 
child, and evidence of a defendant’s drug addiction, a history of abuse, and mental 
impairment.”  Id. at 1497.  The court adhered to the double-edge rationale so strongly, they 
critiqued, that in essence “all psychologically based mitigating evidence” was a “‘two-edged 
sword,’ because although evidence of a defendant’s mental impairment may diminish his 
blameworthiness for his crime, it also may indicate[] that there is a probability that he will be 
dangerous in the future.”  Id. at 1480-81 (quotations omitted); see id. at 1497 (“The Fourth 
Circuit will simply imagine how a juror might possibly view the mitigating evidence in a 
negative light, find that the mitigating evidence is “two-edged,” and conclude that the 
defendant cannot show prejudice.”).  The double-edged sword principle, if rooted in 
legitimate concerns of hurting the case for life, was—as used by counsel seeking to justify 
limited investigation and by courts approving of the same—extremely broad.  See, e.g., St. 
Pierre v. Walls, 297 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2002) (reversing grant of relief by district court).  
“[T]he availability and admissibility of practically any evidence is a double-edged sword.  If 
counsel introduces mitigating evidence the prosecution can rebut with other evidence, which 
may turn out to be substantially more damaging.”  Id. at 632 (citing Darden v. Wainright, 
477 U.S. 168, 185-86 (1986)). 
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shortcomings in counsel’s performance, the second asks whether those 
shortcomings mattered.  It is hard to imagine that Woodson, in fashioning a 
constitutional requirement of individualized sentencing, intended a 
circumstance where counsel would routinely disregard substantial 
mitigation out of fear that, despite the evidence’s mitigating potential, it 
might be perceived as aggravating, and therefore forego the evidence in 
favor of a limited or incomplete theory of mitigation.  That was the case, 
however, before Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla. 
At first glance, the holdings and reasoning of the new cases plainly 
will not accept investigations limited merely by fear of mitigating 
evidence’s double edge.  After all, in each case, the Supreme Court rejected 
trial counsel’s post hoc attempt to justify an abbreviated investigation as the 
product of a mitigation theory.  The Court rejected counsel’s “strategic” 
decision to limit mitigation to residual doubt in Rompilla;109 to lack of 
criminal responsibility in Wiggins;110 and to showing that the client was a 
“nice boy” in Williams.111  Moreover, the Williams Court wrote of the 
importance of explanatory mitigation, faulting counsel for thinking that a 
mere positive-evidence presentation could suffice.112  The very 
investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence the Court allowed 
counsel to bypass in Burger and Darden, it now champions. 
But what the new precedent says about the old precedent a reader may 
find surprising.  If Williams foretold an end to the relevance of Burger’s 
principle, Wiggins and Rompilla hedged.  Rather than excise Burger as an 
anachronism, or explain that the course taken in Burger could only apply 
following a full mitigation investigation (as one would expect given the 
reasoning of the Court’s decisions), the Court settled for merely 
distinguishing—and not very convincingly—the factual circumstances of 
the old precedent from the new.  The Court said that “Wiggins’ history 
contained little of the double edge we have found to justify limited 
investigations,”113 and distinguished Burger, Darden, and Strickland as 
cases where counsel actually knew of harmful evidence, which they 
intentionally avoided: 
 
109 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 378 (2005). 
110 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); see Brief of Respondents, supra note 77, at 
2-9. 
111 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000). 
112 Id.; see, e.g., Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The State asserts, and 
we acknowledge, that not all of the evidence in the records counsel failed to investigate is 
favorable to Outten.  This is nearly always the case.  Indeed, the same was true of the 
evidence not investigated by counsel in Williams.”). 
113 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. 
Wainright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)). 
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 [C]ounsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation 
case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation 
would have been fruitless; this case is therefore distinguishable from our precedents in 
which we have found limited investigations into mitigating evidence to be reasonable.  
See, e.g., Strickland (concluding that counsel could “reasonably surmise . . . that 
character and psychological evidence would be of little help”); Burger v. Kemp 
(concluding counsel’s limited investigation was reasonable because he interviewed all 
witnesses brought to his attention, discovering little that was helpful and much that 
was harmful); Darden v. Wainwright (concluding that counsel engaged in extensive 
preparation and that the decision to present a mitigation case would have resulted in 
the jury hearing evidence that petitioner had been convicted of violent crimes and 
spent much of his life in jail).114 
Similarly, in Rompilla, the Court described Burger as a case in which 
“limited investigation [was] reasonable because all witnesses brought to 
counsel’s attention provided predominantly harmful information,” and 
differentiated Strickland again as a case in which “counsel could reasonably 
surmise . . . that character and psychological evidence would be of little 
help.”115  “[R]easonably diligent counsel,” the Court remarked, “may draw 
a line when they have good reason to think further investigation would be a 
waste.”116 
Upon closer inspection, the factual distinctions in each decision are 
questionable.  In light of contemporary standards, characterizing Darden as 
a case of “extensive investigation” seems far outdated.  Describing Burger 
as a “limited investigation” to tactically avoid “predominantly harmful 
information” rings untrue because the types of mitigation found harmful in 
Burger (childhood abuse and neglect and mental illness) are just those that 
counsel failed to uncover in Wiggins.  The Wiggins Court’s attempt to 
distinguish the evidence of “troubled childhood and severe mental 
problems” at issue in Wiggins from the “violent conduct” counsel feared in 
Burger117 itself implies Burger’s limits and, further, does not distinguish 
Williams or Rompilla, who did have a record of violence.118  Finally, the 
Court’s suggestion that counsel in Wiggins and Rompilla did not know of 
 
114 Id. at 525 (citations omitted). 
115 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 Id. 
117 See White, supra note 14, at 2059-60 (“Based on Wiggins itself, a capital defendant’s 
attorney cannot reasonably conclude that introducing mitigating evidence relating to a 
defendant’s troubled childhood or severe mental problems would be so double-edged that the 
attorney can curtail investigation for such evidence. . . . Justice O’Connor emphasized that 
the mitigating evidence available in Wiggins did not show that Wiggins had previously 
engaged in violent conduct.”). 
118 See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 378 (“Rompilla had a significant history of felony 
convictions indicating the use or threat of violence.”); Williams, 529 U.S. at 368 (“The 
prosecution described two auto thefts and two separate violent assaults on elderly victims 
perpetrated [by Williams].”). 
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the mitigation at issue119 is forced because counsel testified they were aware 
that mitigating evidence existed.120 
However unconvincing these distinctions, there can be no mistake that 
Wiggins and Rompilla send mixed messages about counsel’s duty to 
investigate and present explanatory mitigation and about the impact of 
explanatory mitigation on a jury insofar as it is relevant to determining 
prejudice.  Is explanatory mitigation the classic background information 
that is the bread and butter of the individualized sentencing determination 
that Woodson envisions?  Or is it evidence with a double edge that would 
have made little mitigating impact on the jury and might have hurt the case 
for life?  The new cases emphasize the need for comprehensive life history 
investigation and endorse the ABA Death Penalty Guidelines, but leave the 
old law of Burger, Darden, and Strickland—historically, strategery’s most 
reliable refuge—standing.121  Can the new decisions finally “give[] teeth”122 
 
119 By implication, if counsel had been aware, they could have made a reasoned choice 
not to pursue the evidence for the reasons enunciated in Burger.  By this reading, once 
counsel does some investigation into available mitigating evidence, greater deference is due 
counsel’s strategic decisions.  This reasoning could extend to the presentation of evidence as 
well.  See Kyle Graham, Tactical Ineffective Assistance in Capital Trials, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 
1645, 1664-65 (2008) (“Once counsel becomes aware of the available mitigation evidence, 
substantial deference will adhere to his or her decisions regarding the presentation of this 
material at trial. . . . [C]ourts rarely second-guess informed decisions by counsel regarding 
what facts, within the universe of available evidence, should be presented at the penalty 
phase of a capital trial.”). 
120 The Wiggins majority intimated that counsel never reviewed the content of the PSI 
and DSS records, but the postconviction testimony shows otherwise.  Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 
538 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. at 545 (noting that counsel “testified in the state 
postconviction proceedings that he was aware . . . that Wiggins was subjected to neglect and 
abuse from his mother, that there were reports of sexual abuse at one of his foster homes, 
that his mother had burned his hands as a child, that a Job Corps supervisor had made 
homosexual overtures toward him, and that Wiggins was ‘borderline’ mentally retarded.”  
(citations omitted)); id. at 546 (arguing that counsel “was aware of all this potential 
mitigating evidence, [but] chose not to present it to the jury for a strategic reason—namely, 
that it would conflict with his efforts to persuade the jury that Wiggins was not a ‘principal’ 
in [the] murder (i.e., that he did not kill [the victim] by his own hand”). 
121 Shortly after Wiggins, an article thoughtfully explored this tension.  White, supra note 
14.  After careful consideration of the competing precedent, the study concluded that 
“[b]ased on Wiggins’s holding and analysis, the circumstances under which a capital 
defendant’s attorney’s strategic choice to curtail an investigation for mitigating evidence will 
constitute deficient performance [are] unclear.”  Id. at 2022 (“The Court’s analysis does not 
suggest . . . that an attorney could never reasonably make a strategic choice to curtail 
investigation because she concluded that seeking additional mitigating evidence would be 
unproductive.  On the contrary, the Court intimated that an attorney would be able to justify 
such a choice in cases where the attorney could reasonably conclude that she would not want 
to introduce potential mitigating evidence because of a concern that it would be 
unproductive or double-edged.”). 
122 Rigg, supra note 93, at 97. 
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to Strickland’s ineffectiveness test if they have not closed the doors to 
strategery? 
Closing the doors to strategery, as the case survey in the next section 
illustrates, involves more than clarifying precedent.  But it is a necessary 
initial step, and I will make some attempt here.  Despite the Court’s 
reluctance to explicitly overrule Burger and Darden, the principles and 
reasoning of the new precedent plainly demand that no decision to limit 
mitigation investigation is reasonable unless a thorough life history 
investigation precedes it.  In other words, counsel cannot make a reasonable 
decision about what to investigate or not investigate, or what to present or 
not present to the jury, without a full picture of the client’s life.  The Death 
Penalty Guidelines, Wiggins’s guides, point overwhelmingly against 
limitations on investigation, especially after counsel discovers leads 
evincing explanatory mitigation such as a horrible childhood or mental 
illness.  These issues also turn on counsel’s ethical duties in capital cases, 
and those duties, stressed by ethics authorities,123 permeate the practice of 
the very defense litigators who have developed and advanced capital 
practice over the past three decades.124  Parsing the language of the Court’s 
new decisions to create a gaping loophole for abbreviated investigations 
whenever counsel is aware of explanatory mitigation would indeed be 
ironic, because the thorough investigation that Williams, Wiggins, Rompilla, 
and the Death Penalty Guidelines demand is an effort to discover just the 
sort of information—and to discover it in detail—that Burger allowed 
counsel to dismiss after very little searching. 
At the very least, the new cases demand a merger of the old precedent 
with modern standards of practice.  This means modifying Burger to 
require investigation along the lines of what the Guidelines call for today.  
As such, abandoning investigation of an explanatory mitigation avenue may 
be reasonable in limited circumstances, but is subject to much more 
scrutiny than counsel’s performance in the 1970s.  Prevailing professional 
norms require a more nuanced consideration of the pros and cons of 
integrating positive and double-edged evidence before deciding to 
refrain.125  For example, although counsel must account for aggravating 
 
123 See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually 
Reinforcing Responsibilities, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 775 (2008). 
124 See, e.g., White, supra note 14, at 2038-42 (reporting interviews with experienced 
capital litigators). 
125 For an example of investigation that would have been accepted in Darden and Burger 
but not now, see Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 418 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It was standard 
practice at the time of Outten’s trial for a death-eligible defendant’s penalty-phase 
investigation to include his medical history, educational history, family and social history, 
employment history, and adult and juvenile correctional records.  Counsel’s investigation, 
however, was limited solely to conversations with Outten and his mother—a woman who, as 
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evidence and counteract future dangerousness testimony,126 rather than 
reject mitigating evidence with a double edge, “[c]ounsel should integrate 
the defense response to the prosecution’s evidence in aggravation with the 
overall theory of the case.”127  By this reading, which preserves the 
recognizable meaning of the new cases that most commentators advance, 
even if Burger and Darden remain law, the new precedent leaves little room 
for strategery to excuse counsel’s shortcomings.  The reasoning of Wiggins, 
Williams, and Rompilla, which demand thorough investigation before 
tactical decisions, relegate Burger and Darden principles to a small set of 
cases in which counsel first substantially investigates and only then seeks to 
limit additional investigation or the presentation of evidence—to cases, in 
other words, in which counsel’s decisions are not post hoc anyway. 
Before moving on, other recent precedent, which has not been all 
positive for those seeking a stronger right to effective counsel, deserves 
mention.  Since Williams, the Court has reaffirmed its suggestion in 
Strickland that counsel are not ineffective for following a directive by the 
client not to present mitigating evidence.128  The Court has reversed a grant 
of habeas relief for sentencing ineffectiveness, determining that a state 
court’s finding of no prejudice was not unreasonable given the 
overwhelming aggravating evidence in the case.129  But the decision most 
 
demonstrated by the unreviewed-by-counsel records, had not ‘shown great[ ] continued 
interest in [her son].’  We conclude that this effort fell well short of the national prevailing 
professional standards articulated by the American Bar Association and was, therefore, 
unreasonable.”  (citation omitted)). 
126 2003 GUIDELINES, supra note 51, guideline 10.11(G), at 1056-57 (“In determining 
what presentation to make concerning penalty, counsel should consider whether any portion 
of the defense case will open the door to the prosecution’s presentation of otherwise 
inadmissible aggravating evidence. “).  Id. guideline 10.11 cmt., at 1062 (“Counsel should 
give serious consideration to making an explicit presentation of information on [future 
dangerousness].”).   
127 Id. guideline 10.11 cmt., at 1065.  The Guidelines suggest using motions in limine “to 
ensure that the defense case concerning penalty is constricted as little as possible by this 
consideration.”  Id. guideline 10.11(G), at 1057.  The Guidelines also provide: 
[I]n preparing a defense presentation on mitigation, counsel must try to anticipate the evidence 
that may be admitted in response and to tailor the presentation to avoid opening the door to 
damaging rebuttal evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. . . . However . . . if there is 
uncertainty as to the scope of how wide this opening would be or if counsel believes that 
excessive rebuttal is to be admitted, they should object and make a full record on the issue. 
Id. at 1064 & n.291. 
128 Shriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 481 (2007). 
129 Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 26 (2002).  The Court held so despite counsel’s  
failure to present evidence of respondent’s “troubled family background,” which included his 
being “berated,” being “markedly lacking in self-esteem and depressed,” having been “born with 
club feet,” having “feelings of inadequacy, incompetence, inferiority,” and the like, moving “20 
times” while he was growing up, and possibly suffering a “seizure disorder.” 
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pertinent to the Court’s treatment of explanatory mitigation is Bell v. 
Thompson.130  In Thompson, the Court considered a decision by a Sixth 
Circuit panel, which recalled its mandate denying relief on ineffective 
assistance of sentencing counsel, and then granted relief, after discovering 
the deposition of a mental health expert showing that the defendant-
petitioner grew up in horrible circumstances, had a family history of mental 
illness, and suffered from schizophrenia throughout childhood, adolescence, 
and at the time of the crime.131  Reversing the panel decision, the Court 
found that the mitigating evidence, while undoubtedly relevant, was 
“unlikely to have altered the District Court’s resolution of Thompson’s 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”132  Thompson’s trial attorneys, the 
Court added, made a strategic decision, after interviewing Thompson’s 
grandmother, sister, and ex-girlfriend, “not to pursue a mitigation strategy 
based on mental illness,” and rather present “character evidence from 
family and friends and expert testimony that he had the capacity to adjust to 
prison.”133  While the question presented in Thompson had to do with abuse 
of the mandate, the Court’s finding that counsel’s performance, which 
ignored compelling evidence of hardship and mental illness, did not 
prejudice Thompson is unsettling.134 
The manner in which the Thompson Court interprets the value of 
explanatory mitigation, focused on its double edge, points to a shelter for 
post hoc rationalization that is more perceptual than doctrinal.  As the next 
section discusses, divergent perceptions among judges over the value of 
explanatory mitigation may be the principal source of the continuing 
tension between contemporary professional standards and the old caselaw.  
Where the federal courts of appeals’ decisions from Williams through the 
end of 2008 display disagreement over the current reach of Burger, at root 
lies a difference in perception about the value of much of the background 
evidence that Lockett and Woodson deem fundamental. 
 
Id. 
130 545 U.S. 794 (2005) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 
U.S. 685 (2002) (denying a claim of sentencing ineffectiveness after applying Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)). 
131 545 U.S. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
132 Id. at 808-09 (majority opinion). 
133 Id. at 810.  A four justice dissent written by Justice Breyer strenuously disagreed.  Id. 
at 827 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
134 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in another case that, like Thompson, 
involves sentencing ineffectiveness as a secondary issue.  See Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281 
(11th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2389 (2009) (mem.).  The questions presented 
address the application of the AEDPA—specifically the interaction of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1)—to the review of state court fact determinations.  See Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wood v. Allen, No. 08-9156 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2009), 2009 WL 
1370171. 
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IV.  GENERATION GAPS: SURVEYING THE INEFFECTIVE DIVIDE IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
Following Strickland in 1984 and throughout the 1990s, a grant of 
relief for ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to investigate and 
present mitigating evidence was something no postconviction petitioner 
could expect, even if well deserved.  Today, following Williams, Wiggins, 
and Rompilla, if courts measure ineffective assistance according to more 
demanding contemporary standards, one would expect some increase in the 
number of victorious sentencing ineffectiveness claims.  Even if Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla simply stand as a strong reminder of the evolving 
standards of capital defense practice, one might anticipate a rise in 
successful claims.  Since the Court decided Williams in April 2000, 
hundreds of claims of attorney failure to adequately investigate or present 
mitigating evidence—raised in state prisoners’ petitions for federal habeas 
corpus or federal prisoners’ habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255—have 
come before the federal courts of appeals.  Between Williams and the end of 
2008, the courts of appeals addressed the issue in over three hundred 
cases.135  Of these, 51 resulted in grants of relief, 254 in denials, and the 
remaining handful were remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  This marks 
slightly greater success than in the 1980s and 1990s, but not by much.136 
Dispositions by the circuit courts show that courts are, by and large, 
staying the course.  In the Fourth, Fifth, or Eleventh Circuits, for example, 
which found not a single lawyer ineffective in capital sentencing prior to 
Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, the success rate of claims of ineffective 
assistance of capital counsel at sentencing remains very low.  In the Fourth 
Circuit, only one claim resulted in a grant of relief out of forty-six.  The 
Fifth Circuit heard over seventy such claims, granting relief only twice.  
And the Eleventh Circuit assessed counsel’s failure to investigate and 
 
135 The breakdown by circuit between Williams and the end of 2008 is as follows: Third 
Circuit, nine cases; Fourth Circuit, forty-six cases; Fifth Circuit, seventy-one cases; Sixth 
Circuit, fifty-one cases; Seventh Circuit, nine cases; Eighth Circuit, fifteen cases; Ninth 
Circuit, thirty-seven cases; Tenth Circuit, twenty-eight cases; and Eleventh Circuit, forty-
nine cases.  The First, Second, and Twelfth Circuits have not adjudicated claims of this type 
in the capital context.  This encompasses all claims of ineffectiveness of counsel based on 
capital counsel’s failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence, including claims 
alleging an overall failure to investigate or present evidence, as well as claims alleging 
limited failures to investigate or present evidence (e.g., failure to present the testimony of a 
particular individual or expert).  See infra Appendices 1 (listing cases and dispositions in the 
Sixth Circuit) and 2 (listing cases and dispositions in the Fourth Circuit).  The Sixth Circuit 
and Fourth Circuit are chosen as representative of jurisdictions that grant relief and do not 
grant relief, respectively, for ineffectiveness at capital sentencing. 
136 See Graham, supra note 119, at 1656 (noting that “[i]n recent years, courts have 
become slightly more receptive to claims alleging the ineffective investigation and 
presentation of mitigating evidence—but only slightly”). 
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present mitigating evidence in forty-nine cases and granted relief in only 
two.137 
Other circuits, also maintaining roughly the same course as before 
Williams, present a different picture.  The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits 
granted relief occasionally for sentencing ineffectiveness before Williams, 
and still do.  In the Third Circuit, five of nine petitions won relief on 
sentencing ineffectiveness; one of the denials was Rompilla, which the 
Supreme Court reversed.  The Sixth Circuit granted relief in sixteen of fifty-
two cases, denied relief in thirty-four, and remanded two.  The Ninth 
Circuit granted relief on capital sentencing ineffectiveness in seventeen 
cases, denied relief twelve times, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing 
in eight cases.  Twenty-eight claims of sentencing ineffectiveness came 
before the Tenth Circuit between Williams and the end of 2008, resulting in 
five grants of relief, twenty denials, and three remands for evidentiary 
hearings.138 
Together, the Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit have granted relief on 
sentencing ineffectiveness claims since Williams more than the Fourth, 
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits combined (compare sixteen 
grants of relief in the Sixth Circuit and seventeen in the Ninth Circuit to 
thirteen successful claims in the five circuits combined).139  A petitioner 
presenting a sentencing ineffectiveness claim in the Sixth Circuit has an 
approximately 33% chance of relief; in the Ninth Circuit, a defendant has 
near a 50% chance of relief.  Compare that to the Fifth Circuit, where the 
odds since Williams—with one grant in seventy-one claims—are a sobering 
1.4%; the Fourth Circuit, where the rate of success is 2.2%; or the Eleventh 
Circuit, where the odds remain extremely low at 4%, and a discrepancy is 
clear. 
If Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla have strengthened constitutional 
review of capital counsel’s performance, one would expect a more uniform 
rise, across all Circuits.  Certainly the low number of successful claims in 
the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits is not explained by the superiority 
of representation provided by court-appointed trial counsel in those 
 
137 See infra Appendix 2 (listing cases and dispositions in the Fourth Circuit). 
138 See infra Appendix 1 (listing cases and dispositions in the Sixth Circuit). 
139 In circuits that grant relief on sentencing ineffectiveness more than once in a blue 
moon, the rate of success appears to have increased slightly over time in response to the new 
trio of cases.  Looking at claims in the Sixth Circuit chronologically after the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla shows that, since Wiggins, the court 
has granted relief in twelve cases and denied relief in twenty-four, and since Rompilla, the 
court has granted relief in ten cases and denied relief in twenty-one.  In 2007, the court 
granted relief in two cases and denied relief in six.  In 2008, the court granted relief on the 
issue in four cases and denied relief in six.  See infra Appendix 1. 
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jurisdictions.140 Some of the trio’s small impact may be attributable to the 
restrictions on relief from state judgments in federal habeas corpus imposed 
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).141  But the 
Court in Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla was restrained by the AEDPA 
and granted relief, so the AEDPA alone cannot explain the trio’s muted 
impact.  Nor would the uniformly applicable AEDPA explain the 
discrepancy between the circuits.  While the quality of postconviction and 
habeas counsel may have some impact, dissension within cases shows that 
other factors are at work. 
A close look at federal courts of appeals decisions since Williams 
shows neither that counsel across the country are doing a great job nor that 
courts are ignoring the emphasis that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla 
placed on the importance of a full life history investigation.  Rather, the 
muted impact of the new precedent derives in significant part from (1) 
differing views on how to read Wiggins’s and Rompilla’s acceptance of 
Burger and Darden and simultaneous adherance to contemporary standards 
of performance as set forth in the Death Penalty Guidelines; and (2) 
differing perceptions of the value of explanatory mitigation.  As the 
following case examples illustrate, the Court’s message after Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla is incomplete.  This has left room for differences in 
interpretation that divide the circuits and the panels within some circuits.142  
 
140 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why 
Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal Judges Is Indispensable to Protecting 
Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1805 (2000) (criticizing quality of court-appointed 
capital defense lawyers in Texas, which is under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit). 
141 See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (reversing grant of habeas relief based 
on sentencing ineffectiveness on the ground that the Ninth Circuit failed to properly apply 
§ 2254(d)(1) of the AEDPA to a state court determination of Strickland prejudice).  Because 
Strickland is a general rule, a state court’s application has to be pretty far off the mark before 
it meets the “unreasonableness” standard that the statute requires to grant the writ.  See 
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308-09 (1992) (“Where the beginning point is a rule of . . . 
general application, a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual 
contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, 
one not dictated by precedent.”) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  See generally Evan Tsen Lee, 
Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute: Is It Beyond Reason?, 56 HASTINGS L. J. 283 
(2004). 
142 See, e.g., Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (reversing district court denial 
of sentencing ineffectiveness relief and denying rehearing en banc over five judge dissent), 
cert. denied sub nom. Schriro v. Correll, 129 S. Ct. 903 (2009) (mem.); Wilson v. Sirmons, 
536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008) (reversing district court denial of sentencing ineffectiveness 
relief), reh’g en banc granted, 549 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Wilson v. 
Workman, 577 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (reversing district court grant of sentencing relief), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2389 
(2009) (mem.); Foster v. Schomig, 223 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court 
grant of sentencing ineffectiveness relief and denying rehearing en banc over four judge 
dissent). 
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Rather than the moot point of whether Wiggins changed the law, a more 
important question is how Burger and the dismissive attitude toward 
explanatory mitigation at its root fare today. 
A. WIGGINS’S LOOPHOLE 
In the Sixth Circuit, the divergent views of appellate panels stand like 
two sides of a canyon, and a petitioner’s ineffectiveness claim a glider 
whose fate, for better or worse, resides on whichever side it lands.  In this 
Circuit, where a petitioner bringing a mitigation ineffectiveness claim has a 
roughly one in three chance of getting relief, the pattern of how individual 
judges vote for or against sentencing phase ineffectiveness relief is marked.  
The basis for this difference is not that certain judges are expressly for or 
against the death penalty,143 or that particular judges believe in mitigation as 
an Eighth Amendment requirement while others do not.144  The division is 
not, in other words, because members of the court would not impose death 
under any circumstance, or because a member of the court does not believe 
in the right to individualized sentencing.  The difference is not about Eighth 
Amendment fundamentals.  It concerns the Sixth Amendment—
specifically, what the Constitution requires of capital defense counsel 
investigating and presenting mitigating evidence.145 
The most immediate measures of this difference are cases that involve 
a common set of facts, in which one court reverses another or individual 
members of the court disagree, such as a panel decision on an issue in 
which one of three judges dissents, an en banc reversal of a panel decision, 
a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc, or a circuit court panel’s reversal 
of the district court decision below.  An advantage of looking at these cases 
is that it eliminates the performance of postconviction and habeas counsel 
as a factor: the judges heard the same evidence, witnessed the same 
presentation by collateral counsel, yet reached different conclusions.  In the 
 
143 Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229, 231 (1976) (Brennan, J., & Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (concluding the the Eighth Amendment forbids the death penalty in all 
circumstances). 
144 Cf. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 669-73 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(concluding that the principle of individualized sentencing has no basis in the Eighth 
Amendment). 
145 See, e.g., Keith v. Mitchell, 466 F.3d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 2006) (Martin, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Indeed, members of this Court have gone on the record 
to second-guess the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and this Court, that requires 
counsel to conduct an adequate investigation of potential mitigating circumstances for 
purposes of capital sentencing, and mandates the reversal of convictions where this does not 
occur.  This reasoning strikes me as demonstrating callousness and possible animosity 
toward the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”) (citing Poindexter v. Mitchell, 454 F.3d 
564, 588 (6th Cir. 2006) (Boggs, J., concurring); id. at 589 (Suhrheinrich, J., concurring)). 
1020 CHRISTOPHER SEEDS [Vol. 99 
fifty-two Sixth Circuit decisions on sentencing ineffectiveness, over half 
(twenty-nine) involve dissents.146  There are a handful of splits in other 
postures—one en banc reversal of a panel decision, one dissent from the 
denial of rehearing en banc, and three panel reversals of district court 
rulings.  In sum, nearly 60% (32 of 54) of the Sixth Circuit’s decisions on 
the effectiveness of capital counsel’s mitigation investigation and 
presentation come with a dissent or involve some disagreement on the 
application of Sixth Amendment law to the facts of the case.  Judges in 
other circuits share contrasting views, but in no circuit is the distribution as 
noticeable and as contentious as in the Sixth Circuit.147 
1. Case Example 1: West v. Bell (6th Cir. 2008) 
In the last case on sentencing ineffectiveness the Sixth Circuit decided 
in 2008, the majority relied on Burger and denied the writ; the dissent 
applied Wiggins and would have granted relief, finding ineffective 
assistance based on counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating 
evidence.148  The case involved a twenty-three year old defendant, 
convicted and sentenced to death in 1987 for the murder and rape of a 
fifteen year old girl and the murder of her mother.149  West’s trial attorney 
decided to show that West had been “a good and decent citizen: that he had 
never before been in trouble with the law, that he was a veteran who served 
his country, and that he was a loving husband and a soon-to-be father.”150  
Counsel presented six witnesses at sentencing: three family friends; the 
county sheriff, who testified that West was peaceable in jail prior to trial; 
 
146 See infra Appendix 1. 
147 The characteristics of decisions differ by Circuit.  For example, in contrast to the 
Sixth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit unanimously denies nearly every sentencing ineffectiveness 
claim.  See infra Appendix 2.  The Fifth Circuit’s panel decisions on sentencing 
ineffectiveness, like the Fourth Circuit’s, are almost always unanimous, but they are usually 
short and often per curiam.  Many Fifth Circuit decisions in this area are unreported.  The 
prevalence of unreported decisions suggests that the court views these cases as easy 
decisions; however, the approach taken in many is questionable and debated by judges in 
other circuits.  Most often, the court adjudicates sentencing ineffectiveness claims by 
skipping the performance prong and considering only prejudice, which it then dismisses on 
the ground that the uncovered mitigation was double-edged, cumulative, or overwhelmed by 
the strength of aggravating factors.  An exception is the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Walbey v. 
Quarterman, 309 Fed. App’x 795 (5th Cir. 2009), in which the court, granting relief on 
sentencing ineffectiveness, provided a thorough discussion of prejudice, noting that it long 
ago rejected the argument that the brutality of a crime trumps mitigation.  Other circuits also 
have distinguishing features.  The Eleventh Circuit, despite Wiggins, maintains along the 
lines of Burger that counsel need not investigate the defendant’s complete background, only 
what is constitutionally compelled. See Ford v. Hall, 546 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2008). 
148 West v. Bell, 550 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2008). 
149 Id. at 546. 
150 Id. at 556. 
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West’s sister, who testified that “West was the baby of the family and had 
never been in trouble”; and West’s wife, who stated under oath that “they 
had a good relationship and that West was a good father to their eleven-
month-old daughter.”151  The sentencing proceeding’s last witness was 
West, who admitted his presence at the scene but denied murdering the 
victims and said that “he had no prior criminal records, had been an honor 
student in school, and had never had any disciplinary problems.”152 
West’s trial counsel left out that West was a frequent victim of abuse 
when he was young, that he was born in a psychiatric hospital where his 
mother was a patient, and that he had a history of psychological instability 
throughout childhood and adolescence.  Counsel interviewed West’s sister, 
his parents, and his wife, but did not hire a mental health expert for 
mitigation, obtained no employment, medical, or school records, and failed 
to introduce military records pointing to a history of child abuse.153  
Looking back, West’s counsel sought to justify the failure to conduct a 
more thorough investigation as a tactical decision to present only evidence 
that portrayed West in a positive light. 
West presents a scenario very similar to Williams and Wiggins: 
counsel’s failure to conduct a full life history investigation resulted in a 
limited and lopsided mitigation presentation (along the lines of Rompilla), 
subsequently explained as a strategic decision to avoid presenting evidence 
that the jury might interpret to support a finding of future dangerousness.  
Looking to Burger, the panel majority decided that “an explanation of 
petitioner’s history would not have minimized the risk of the death penalty” 
and that trial counsel’s decision “not to mount an all-out investigation into 
petitioner’s background in search of mitigating circumstances was 
supported by reasonable professional judgment.”154  Even if counsel 
pursued “the evidence of West growing up victimized by abuse and 
psychological instability,” the majority surmised, “the very same evidence 
may have had the opposite effect on the jury.”155  The jury, the court 
continued, “might have believed that violence begets violence and that 
West’s past abuse made him the kind of person who could have raped and 
tortured a fifteen year-old girl.  They might have despised West and 
sentenced him to death with greater zeal.”156  The court concluded that West 
had not proved deficient performance.157 
 
151 Id. at 547. 
152 Id. at 547. 
153 Id. at 554. 
154 Id. at 554-55 (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 776, 794 (1987)). 
155 Id. at 556. 
156 Id. at 556. 
157 Id. at 556. 
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The dissent, in contrast, perceived that counsel failed to follow leads in 
military records, which included allegations of abuse and evidence of 
West’s birth in a psychiatric hospital, and that this rendered the decision to 
limit the mitigation investigation unreasonable.158  Chiding the majority for 
giving mere lip service to Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, the dissent 
found the evidence of abuse  
would have changed West’s mitigation case from one about West’s character as ‘a 
good and decent citizen,’ ‘never before . . . in trouble with the law,’ ‘a veteran,’ and ‘a 
loving husband and a soon-to-be father,’ to one that actually explained why West 
behaved the way that he behaved.159 
Quoting Rompilla, the dissent concluded that the “evidence adds up to a 
mitigation case that bears no relation to the mitigation case actually 
presented by counsel.”160 
Seen through the prism of the new precedent, West turns on the 
question of how much investigation trial counsel must do before they can 
reasonably decide to curtail further avenues of investigation or limit the 
evidence presented to the sentencing jury.  The West majority believed that 
interviewing the client and several family members; consulting a mental 
health expert, but only with respect to competence to stand trial; and 
obtaining no school, employment, or medical records sufficed as a basis for 
limiting mitigation to good character evidence.  Surely Wiggins refutes the 
panel majority’s finding of no deficient performance.  The investigation in 
West comes nowhere near what Wiggins found necessary and bears no 
resemblance to the thorough investigation called for by the Death Penalty 
Guidelines.  In fact, counsel’s failures in West are comparable to those in 
Wiggins and Rompilla.  The failure to obtain records was particularly 
important in West because counsel was aware of indications of mental 
illness.  West’s attorney did not know enough about West’s life history to 
make a reasonable decision to limit the investigation and the mitigation 
theory.  And yet, the Sixth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. 
As easy a case as West is under the Court’s recent precedent, however, 
it is also straightforward under Burger.  Seen through the prism of Burger, 
trial counsel, after interviewing several easily accessible witnesses and 
catching inklings of abuse and mental illness in petitioner’s background, 
dropped those avenues, believing sufficient positive information about the 
client existed that he need not risk alarming the jurors, whom he thought 
might take the evidence of childhood abuse as indicating a potential to 
abuse others as an adult and the mental illness history as an indication of 
 
158 Id. at 569 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
159 Id. at 569. 
160 Id. at 569 (quoting Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 393 (2005)). 
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future dangerousness.  Burger said that the double-edged nature of the 
evidence in question makes that a reasonable choice. 
Is West’s counsel’s testimony “strategery”—a post hoc rationalization 
by counsel who failed to do his job?  Or was this a reasonable response to a 
client’s unsavory background by the client’s lawyer, the person in the best 
position to decide what evidence the jury should hear?  The answer that the 
new precedent provides is that, absent a thorough mitigation investigation, 
counsel is in no position to make decisions of the sort Burger allowed.  
West shelters post hoc rationalizations, and is wrongly decided because the 
panel majority made no effort to infuse the Burger principle with modern 
standards of practice.  So applied, much of what Wiggins does to advance 
comprehensive mitigation investigations and complete and coherent 
sentencing presentations, Burger undercuts.  But as the next section shows, 
for cases like West that lose in the federal circuit courts, there are others in 
which the dissenting view in West prevails. 
2. Case Example 2: Correll v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2008) 
Also in 2008, the Ninth Circuit split, denying rehearing en banc on the 
issue of sentencing counsel’s effectiveness in a case tried in Arizona in 
1984.161  Trial counsel was aware that the client had a history of drug abuse, 
possible brain damage, spent most of his teen life as a ward of the state or 
inmate, and had previously been committed to psychiatric institutions, but 
did not follow any of these leads.162  Counsel obtained no medical, school, 
corrections, or police records.163  Reminiscent of Burger, all counsel did 
was interview the client’s immediate family and, in doing so, looked only 
for positive information about the client or information that would 
exculpate the client from the crime.164  Counsel presented no mitigation at 
the sentencing proceeding and half-heartedly objected to the state’s 
presentence report, which he acknowledged as “one-sided” but accepted.165  
In postconviction proceedings, trial counsel explained that he feared the 
judge would not be amenable to explanatory mitigating evidence and 
therefore chose to focus exclusively on evidence that the client was “a good 
person . . . who had done good deeds.”166 
 
161 Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Schriro v. 
Correll, 129 S. Ct. 903 (2009) (mem.). 
162 Id. at 943. 
163 Id. at 943. 
164 Id. at 945. 
165 Id. at 946-47, 949.  Counsel also conceded several statutory aggravating factors and 
offered no mitigating factors, which, under Arizona law at the time, mandated the death 
penalty.  Id. at 947. 
166 Id. at 946. 
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A majority of the court saw this as a transparent case of post hoc 
rationalizing, with counsel seeking to cover for an incomplete investigation 
that overlooked powerful mitigation.167  The dissent saw in the same picture 
an assemblage of double-edged evidence that counsel reasonably decided to 
avoid.  Noting that “the Supreme Court in Wiggins repeatedly emphasized 
that the Darden-Burger line of cases remains in effect,”168 the dissent 
stressed that the evidence with a “double edge” that the defendant offered 
“would have enabled the prosecution to present very damaging evidence in 
rebuttal.”169 
After a majority of the Circuit denied rehearing en banc, four judges 
joined the dissenting panel judge, arguing that because the client insisted on 
his innocence, and given “the double-edged nature of the so-called ‘classic 
mitigating evidence,’” a lingering-doubt defense at sentencing was “perhaps 
the only reasonable approach available.”170  Finding that counsel’s 
estimation of the trial judge’s views was “probably accurate and definitely 
reasonable,”171 the en banc dissent criticized the majority opinion for 
“mak[ing] it almost impossible” for capital counsel to provide effective 
assistance:  “Where, as here, defense counsel recognizes that what might 
arguably be mitigating evidence is also damaging,” the dissent concluded, 
“he or she faces an impossible decision.”172 
Like West, Correll seems like an easy case under Wiggins.  Counsel 
did little of the investigation the Death Penalty Guidelines call for and 
presented no evidence at sentencing.  On this tenuous foundation, counsel 
offered as an explanation only that he did not think the trial judge would be 
receptive.  This is precisely the kind of post hoc rationalizing that Wiggins 
should eradicate.  If counsel could do as little investigation as the dissent in 
Correll would permit, the thorough mitigation investigation that Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla require would be all but washed away.  The manner 
in which the West majority and Correll dissent enlist Burger to support an 
abbreviated investigation is a luxury that the language of Wiggins and 
Rompilla allow, but that the principles and reasoning of the cases do not.  
Still, the loophole remains, for the time being, one of strategery’s refuges. 
 
167 Id. at 950-51. 
168 Id. at 956 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
169 Id. at 956. 
170 Id. at 973 (en banc dissent). 
171 Id. at 979. 
172 Id. at 981-82. 
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B. THE PERCEPTUAL DIVIDE: WHAT IS THE VALUE OF 
EXPLANATORY MITIGATION? 
There is more at work than a lack of clarity in the Court’s precedent.  
A court’s decision to follow either Wiggins or Burger is linked to the 
judges’ perspectives on the mitigating value of the information that counsel 
failed to investigate or failed to present.  Of course, different facts warrant 
different results, but this difference in perspective extends beyond the facts 
of any given case.  If a judge thinks a juror hearing evidence of mental 
illness, sexual or physical abuse, or brain damage would find the defendant 
more likely to be dangerous in the future, then Burger’s reasoning retains a 
strong pull, and an attorney’s decision to take a different, more limited 
direction in mitigation seems more reasonable.  If a judge, on the other 
hand, believes a juror would find the same evidence significantly 
mitigating, then counsel’s failure to fully investigate is inexcusable.  Of 
course, a judge’s view on how jurors perceive evidence is linked to his or 
her own perception of the evidence’s mitigating value.  The extent to which 
a judge favors Burger or Wiggins, thus, can be motivated by how the judge 
interprets the mitigating value of certain aspects of a petitioner’s troubled 
social history.  This is illustrated in a recent Tenth Circuit case, Wilson v. 
Sirmons.173  Before discussing Wilson, a note on the significance of judges’ 
perceptions of mitigation to Strickland’s prejudice prong is necessary. 
1.  A Note on Prejudice 
As we saw in West and in Correll’s dissenting opinions, a perceptual 
divide plays out in rulings on Strickland’s first prong when courts consider 
counsel’s decision not to investigate or present evidence of explanatory 
mitigation despite either an incomplete investigation or the ignoring of red 
flags.  Take, for example, the West majority’s comment that, even if counsel 
pursued as mitigation the evidence of West growing up victimized by abuse 
and psychological instability, “the very same evidence may have had the 
opposite[, an aggravating,] effect on the jury.”174  The perceptual divide 
plays out as much, if not more, in rulings on prejudice. 
If explanatory mitigation is characterized as double-edged, counsel’s 
failure to present it is arguably less prejudicial because jurors could have 
perceived the evidence as weighing in favor of a death sentence.  The 
 
173 Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Wilson v. 
Workman, 577 F.3d 1284 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc).  The issue accepted for en banc review 
was whether a federal habeas court properly reviews a state court judgment de novo when 
the state court determines an ineffectiveness claim based on the direct appeal record alone.  
The court answered the question affirmatively.  Wilson, 577 F.3d at 1293. 
174 West v. Bell, 550 F.3d 542,556 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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Correll dissent thus criticized the majority for “ignor[ing] the mountain of 
precedent which requires us . . . to consider not only the likely benefits of 
the mitigating evidence Correll’s counsel failed to present, but also its 
likely drawbacks.”175  Applied in a broad fashion, the double-edge 
argument operates essentially as a “no prejudice” standard that could 
swallow all explanatory mitigation.176  Of course, this perspective is not 
consistent with Williams.  In the Sixth Circuit case Morales v. Mitchell, the 
panel majority rightly cited Williams, concluding that given “the volume 
and compelling nature of th[e] [mitigating] evidence,” there was “a 
reasonable probability that effective counsel could have achieved a different 
outcome”177; the dissent, however, citing to Burger and Darden, concluded 
that “defense counsel’s failure to present allegedly new mitigation evidence 
cannot possibly be deemed prejudicial [because] the additional testimony 
would have made Morales look like a violent and out-of-control drunk who 
presents a danger to society.”178 
A related issue that divides courts on Strickland prejudice is how much 
information is enough to communicate the client’s life history, or parts of it.  
Courts come out differently on the extent to which additional detail would 
impact a jury’s decision.  The Fourth Circuit, for example, has routinely 
dismissed evidence offered in postconviction hearings as cumulative,179 
 
175 Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 956 (9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) 
(citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)). 
176 See, e.g., Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249 (2002) (“[A]ny evidence about Johnson’s 
alleged brain injury, abusive childhood, and drug and alcohol problems is all ‘double edged.’  
In other words, even if his recent claim about this evidence is true, it could all be read by the 
jury to support, rather than detract, from his future dangerousness.”); Bowie v. Branker, 512 
F.3d 112, 121 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Bowie’s history, however underprivileged, would not have 
impacted the jury’s finding of these two aggravating factors. . . . On the other side of the 
balance, the mitigating evidence presented at Bowie’s MAR hearing should be discounted, 
under our precedent, as double-edged.  For example, evidence of Bowie’s alcoholism and the 
absence of parental oversight during his childhood could be viewed as either supporting or 
detracting from the mitigating circumstances of immaturity and youthfulness.  Likewise, had 
counsel for Bowie introduced a mental-health expert at sentencing, the government could 
have introduced experts who . . . would have vigorously opposed the characterization of 
Bowie as suffering from mental illness.” (citations omitted)).  See generally Blume & 
Johnson, supra note 108, at 1502-03 (discussing the Fourth Circuit’s broad use of the 
“double edge” argument in Strickland prejudice determinations). 
177 Morales v. Mitchell, 507 F.3d 916, 935 (6th Cir. 2007) 
178 Id. at 950 (Surheinrich, J., dissenting). 
179 See Moody v. Polk, 408 F.3d 141, 159 (4th Cir. 2005), (“[B]ecause trial counsel 
presented some evidence of Moody’s traumatic and abusive childhood (albeit from less than 
ideal sources), and at least some of the jurors found mitigating circumstances based upon 
this evidence, I concur in the judgment affirming the denial of habeas relief.”).  But see Gray 
v. Branker, 529 F.3d 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding defense counsel’s failure to 
investigate and present mitigating evidence prejudiced petitioner and granting sentencing 
relief). 
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whereas the Third Circuit has consistently found that the quality and nuance 
of mitigating evidence matters.  “Simply because some mitigating evidence 
regarding [a defendant’s] abusive childhood was introduced to the jury,” the 
Third Circuit stated in one decision granting sentencing relief, “it does not 
follow that the jury was provided a comprehensive understanding of [the 
defendant’s] abusive relationship with his father or other aspects of his 
troubled childhood.”180  In another, a unanimous panel affirmed a grant of 
relief on sentencing ineffectiveness, finding the state court wrongly 
“equated the paltry testimony at the penalty phase hearing with the vastly 
expanded testimony provided by friends and family members at the 
[postconviction] hearing.”181  “The two sets of testimony brook no 
comparison,” the panel continued, because “[t]he first left the impression 
that [the defendant] came from a supportive (if poor) family but went on a 
crime spree after the type of disappointments many people face in life 
[and t]he second showed that he had grown up in an extraordinarily 
dysfunctional environment rife with abuse and neglect.”182  A majority of 
the Sixth Circuit panel in Morales took the same path, finding that “the 
available information that Morales’s trial counsel failed to discover and 
present to the jury included many specific details about his tumultuous life, 
continued and uncontrolled alcohol and drug abuse, dysfunctional family 
history, potential mental health problems, and detailed cultural 
background.”183 
To be sure, at times the evidence presented in postconviction is 
cumulative or unimpressive and adds little to the evidence the jury heard at 
trial.  But at other times, the double-edge rationale, and the tendency to 
equate some information on a topic with a detailed exposition, too easily 
discounts mitigation that the Death Penalty Guidelines view as integral to a 
complete and comprehensive life history and that experienced capital 
counsel believe makes an important difference in the case for life.184  These 
 
180 Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 421 (3d Cir. 2006). 
181 Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 291 (3d Cir. 2008). 
182 Id.  See Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 311 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fact that counsel 
presented some mitigating evidence of a different nature and quality seems largely beside the 
point, given the significance of the evidence that was omitted and the reasonable likelihood 
that the totality of the available mitigating evidence . . . might have led to a different result.”) 
(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397-98 (2000)).  But see Ries v. Quarterman, 522 
F.3d 517, 528 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Unlike Wiggins and Williams . . . . [t]he claim here boils 
down to a disagreement with the manner and style in which trial counsel elected to present 
mitigating evidence, a choice which appears to have been strategic.”) (emphasis added). 
183 Morales, 507 F.3d at 935 (quotation marks omitted). 
184 See, e.g., Mark E. Olive, Narrative Works, 77 UMKC L. Rev. 989, 1018-19 (2009); 
White, supra note 14, at 2038-42 (discussing interviews with experienced capital litigators).  
In its starkest form, this includes evidence of mental retardation, which, in part because of its 
double-edged nature, the Supreme Court held constitutes an exemption from the death 
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perspectives on prejudice sanction mitigation presentations based on 
partially complete, yet inadequate investigations.185 
The Wiggins dissent argued that trial counsel knew essentially all the 
facts and the “basic features,” only they were not as “graphic” or “detailed” 
as the evidence presented in postconviction.186  Counsel’s failures, the 
dissent argued, therefore did not prejudice Wiggins because the 
“incremental information” provided in postconviction proceedings would 
not have induced counsel to change their mitigation theory.187  But the 
Wiggins majority recognized that this secured a haven for strategery, and 
Justice Scalia’s dissent did not prevail.188 
2. Case Example 3: Wilson v. Sirmons (10th Cir. 2008) 
On the surface, Wilson v. Sirmons involves a debate like West and 
Correll over whether counsel had a reasonable strategic reason to limit 
mitigation.189  At sentencing in 1996, counsel’s alleged strategy was to 
portray Wilson as a positive role model in prison.  Counsel called six 
witnesses: two who attended church with Wilson and testified that he was 
“mannerable,” “respectful,” and “intelligent”; two teachers who added that 
Wilson was “respectful,” “fun-loving,” and a “very good student”;190 
Wilson’s mother (she had not spoken with counsel previously), who 
testified to Wilson’s involvement in church and briefly about Wilson’s 
 
penalty.  See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 
1281, 1325 (11th Cir. 2008) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (dissenting from reversal of a district 
court grant of relief on sentencing ineffectiveness due to failure to investigate and present 
evidence of diminished mental capacity and mental retardation), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 
2389 (2009) (mem.).  Judge Barkett noted:  
Assuming that a jury would have used evidence of [the defendant’s] mental impairments against 
him directly contravenes the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases that have consistently 
held that diminished mental capacity may suggest to a jury that a defendant is in fact “less 
morally culpable,” and that evidence of even mild retardation is mitigating evidence that should 
be investigated and presented to the jury. 
Id. (citing Atkins, 542 F.3d at 306-07). 
185 See Graham, supra note 119, at 1669 (“[I]f the defendant or petitioner alleges a total 
or near-total failure to investigate mitigation evidence, the potential drawbacks of the 
undiscovered evidence are minimized and only bear upon the question of prejudice; if the 
defendant or petitioner alleges a failure to present mitigation material, the downside of this 
evidence is magnified and made central to both the threshold question of whether counsel 
was ineffective and any prejudice inquiry.  This difference helps explain why it is more 
difficult for a defendant or petitioner to succeed with a ‘failure to present’ argument than 
with a ‘failure to investigate’ challenge.”). 
186 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538, 541 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
187 Id. at 553-54. 
188 Id. at 536 (majority opinion). 
189 Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1085 (10th Cir. 2008). 
190 Id. at 1075. 
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father;191 and a psychologist (provided with incomplete records), whose 
testimony emphasized that Wilson had a high IQ, a “severe mental 
disorder,” and a father who abused drugs and neglected him.192  The 
psychologist’s testimony ultimately focused “on the ‘two pictures’ of Mike.  
On the one hand, you have the picture of the Sunday school-going child.  
On the other, the picture of the gang and the uninvolved father, who did not 
set a particularly good role model.”193  The state’s cross-examination of the 
psychologist focused on Wilson’s high intelligence, enticing the expert to 
classify Wilson as a “psychopath.”  The Tenth Circuit panel described this 
testimony as a “train wreck.”194 
Addressing the performance prong of Strickland, the panel majority 
drew three “important principles” from the Supreme Court’s recent cases: 
(1) some investigation is not enough; (2) the Death Penalty Guidelines 
“serve as reference points for what is acceptable preparation for the 
mitigation phase of a capital case”; and (3) “because of the crucial 
mitigating role that evidence of a poor upbringing or mental health 
problems can have in the sentencing phase, defense counsel must pursue 
this avenue of investigation with due diligence.”195  Applying those 
principles, the panel majority concluded that counsel’s incomplete 
investigation did not support the assertion that the limited mitigation theory 
was a reasonable strategic decision.196  The dissent, by contrast, believed 
counsel “obtained sufficient information about Wilson’s mental health to 
make a reasonable decision about trial strategy.”197  In terms reminiscent of 
 
191 Id. at 1075-76 (“[A]fter defense counsel finished his questioning, [Wilson’s mother 
stated] that she ‘did want to say something else, if I’m allowed.’  Because defense counsel 
had rested, the court could not permit her to do so.”). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 1076.  Counsel waited nearly two years, until only three weeks before the trial, 
to retain the psychologist; and though the expert was able to meet with Wilson several times 
prior to trial and diagnosed Wilson with a series of serious mental disorders (PTSD, bipolar 
disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, schizotypal personality disorders, and others), time 
precluded further testing the expert recommended.  Id. at 1075. 
194 Id. at 1076.  In appellate proceedings, Wilson supplied the psychologist with more 
information, showing that he experienced delusions and hallucinations consistent with 
schizophrenia.  Postconviction evidence also illustrated Wilson’s childhood life, showing 
that Wilson’s father was generally absent, that Wilson’s brother was involved in gangs, and 
that Wilson grew up in an environment populated with gangs, frequently in the line of 
gunfire.  Id. at 1077. 
195 Id. at 1084-85 (citing 1989 GUIDELINES, supra note 51). 
196 Id. at 1091 (noting counsel failed to interview family members, to gather the available 
evidence pertinent to mental illness and Wilson’s youth presented in collateral proceedings, 
to provide the psychologist with background information, and to present the diagnosis of 
mental illness that counsel obtained from the psychologist before trial). 
197 Id. at 1132 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
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those used to uphold the 1975 conviction and death sentence in Darden, the 
dissent emphasized the postconviction evidence’s double edge: 
[The mental health evidence] could have undercut counsel’s chosen strategy of 
focusing on Wilson’s ability to grow into a useful role model for other young men in 
trouble.  A schizophrenia diagnosis could have made Wilson’s mental health problems 
appear more intractable and untreatable, and added ammunition to the prosecution’s 
case that Wilson was a dangerously ill person.   
 As with the evidence of Wilson’s gang involvement, emphasizing Wilson’s mental 
health issues was a two-edged sword.  As the majority believes, the jury may have felt 
some sympathy for Wilson based on a diagnosis of schizophrenia.  But, equally as 
likely, this diagnosis may have supported the prosecution’s portrait of Wilson as a 
dangerous and continuing threat to society.  In this case, counsel could reasonably 
conclude that additional mental health evidence would not help Wilson’s case and 
might actually harm it.198 
The dissent closed with citations to Burger, Darden, and the Supreme 
Court’s more recent decision in Bell v. Thompson.199 
The panel split on prejudice as well.  The majority, following recent 
decisions in other circuits,200 saw in the postconviction evidence important 
nuance and detail.201  The dissent saw repetition202 and a mitigating impact 
lessned by the evidence’s double edge.203  The panel majority responded 
that if mental health evidence’s double edge could eviscerate its mitigating 
value, then “Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, . . . and many more decisions 
across the country holding that the failure of counsel to present mental 
health evidence of this sort was prejudicial” could not have been decided as 
 
198 Id. at 1138 (citations omitted). 
199 Id. at 1141. 
200 See Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326, 1342 (11th Cir. 2008) (“As reported by 
Williams’ family members and Dr. Gelwan, the violence experienced by Williams as a child 
far exceeded—in both frequency and severity—the punishments described at sentencing.”); 
Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 500-01 (6th Cir. 2008) (“As opposed to the evidence 
presented at the hearing, the additional evidence shows that Jells experienced significant 
learning disabilities which caused him great frustration and led to increasingly aggressive 
behavioral responses.  This additional evidence further demonstrates that Jells experienced a 
profound sense of victimization due to his mother’s abusive relationships.  In short, rather 
than being cumulative, this evidence provides a more nuanced understanding of Jells’s 
psychological background and presents a more sympathetic picture of Jells.”). 
201 Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1093-95 (“Far from presenting a full picture of Wilson to the jury, 
counsel failed to present even the most rudimentary facts about his family circumstances 
[and] gave the jury a pitifully incomplete picture of Mr. Wilson.”) (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
202 Id. at 1135 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (“The bulk of the affidavit testimony Wilson 
offers in his habeas petition simply repackages the information counsel actually presented to 
the jury.  This repetition suggests counsel did a reasonably thorough job of uncovering the 
major contours of Wilson’s family and social history.”). 
203 Id. at 1139-40 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
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they were.204  The Supreme Court’s new cases, the majority concluded, “do 
not permit us to regard the failure of counsel to effectively present 
mitigating evidence based on mental health as inconsequential”; rather, that 
is “exactly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from 
jurors.”205 
One scholar of the intersection between the death penalty and mental 
illness has noted that viewing severe mental illness as aggravating evidence 
is inconsistent with the “role that mental illness is supposed to play in 
capital sentencing proceedings.”206  Not presenting information in a capital 
sentencing proceeding hinders the Eighth Amendment ideas at the 
foundation of Woodson—a capital sentencing proceeding should include 
the defendant’s “frailties,” and not merely the defendant’s positive qualities 
or good deeds.  The Wilson dissent’s perspective thus questions the 
“science of mitigation” that has developed as a confluence of professional 
practice, psychology, anthropology, and other sciences over the past several 
decades, which says that full, detailed life histories (containing positive and 
negative information about the defendant) are the most effective way to 
convey the unique frailties of a capital defendant to jurors.  In doing so, the 
Wilson dissent also questioned the prevailing professional norms in capital 
practice, standardized in the Death Penalty Guidelines, which follow this 
science.  It disputes the seasoned view that, in cases as aggravated as capital 
murder cases, merely showing that the defendant has a positive character 
and no more is, except in the rare case, a long shot to humanize the 
defendant. 
All capital counsel, including those intent on meeting the Death 
Penalty Guidelines’ performance standards, face the difficult decision of 
whether to withhold mitigating evidence that could support a finding of 
future dangerousness, despite the mitigating work it would do.  While 
courts have navigated this conflict with the principle that no decision is 
 
204 Id. at 1095-96. 
205 Id. at 1096 (citation omitted). 
206 Ronald J. Tabak, Executing People With Mental Disabilities: How We Can Mitigate 
An Aggravating Situation, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 283, 288-89 (2006) (“What the 
capital sentencer should do is recognize that someone with severe mental illness is seriously 
disabled in a way that is really important to, and diminishes, moral culpability.”).  Tabak 
argues “it does not help a capital defendant that jurors’ or judges’ perceptions about the 
impact of mental illness on future dangerousness is wrong if they are allowed to act on their 
misconceptions or if defense counsel fails to present mental illness due to concern about 
those misconceptions.”  Id. at 289.  Courts have misleadingly cited this source to support a 
conflicting proposition.  See Edwards v. Ayers, 542 F.3d 759, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (denying 
relief on sentencing ineffectiveness and citing Tabak, supra, to support reasonableness of 
counsel’s decision not to present evidence of mental illness out of fear that “juries often view 
severe mental illness as more aggravating than mitigating”). 
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reasonable unless it is based on a full investigation, the divided opinions in 
Wilson illustrate that the issue of how much investigation is reasonable is 
still often intertwined with a judge’s view of the persuasiveness of the 
evidence or the relative damage that would be inflicted by the evidence not 
presented or investigated.  The prejudice assessment, too, depends on how a 
judge, drawing on his or her experience, believes jurors hearing the 
evidence would respond.  The apparent gap between Burger and Wiggins 
that acts as one refuge for strategery thus rests on another, a divide of 
perspective on the value of explanatory, but double-edged, background 
evidence in garnering a life sentence from a jury. 
V. BRIDGING THE PERCEPTUAL DIVIDE: LISTS VERSUS STORIES 
Judicial perspectives on the mitigating versus aggravating value of 
evidence of mental illness, abuse, addiction—in general, evidence that 
explains the defendant, but not necessarily in a positive light—are naturally 
a product, in part, of personal experience and political views. But not 
entirely.  One aspect that makes the opinions in Wilson particularly 
interesting is that, to support their divergent views of whether the evidence 
counsel could have investigated and presented at sentencing would have 
helped or harmed the client, both looked to social science studies for 
guidance.  The panel majority supported its conclusion by noting that a 
“majority of empirical studies demonstrate that mental health evidence has 
a mitigating effect on juries.”207  The dissent countered with additional 
empirical studies and essays suggesting that “[s]evere mental illness . . . 
although appearing to be a compelling mitigating circumstance, raises a 
number of collateral issues that may lead the jury to vote for a sentence of 
death rather than life.”208  As the opinions show, there is a role for research 
on jurors’ attitudes and responsiveness toward evidence, just as there is a 
role for informed professional judgment.  Reference to social science 
reached a stalemate in Wilson, however, because, as the majority opinion 
acknowledged, many of the studies (some conflicting) come from the same 
data set and are nearly a decade old.  The studies arguably cut both ways, 
 
207 Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1096 n.4 (citing Blume, supra note 18; Bowers, supra note 18; 
Garvey, supra note 13, at 27 n.4). 
208 Id. at 1139-40 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (quoting Sundby, supra note 2, at 1165).  
The Wilson dissent also cited Leona D. Jochnowitz, Missed Mitigation: Counsel’s Evolving 
Duty to Assess and Present Mitigation at Death Penalty Sentencing, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 1 
(2007), and James M. Doyle, The Lawyers’ Art: ‘Representation’ in Capital Cases, 8 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 417 (1996). 
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showing that double-edged mitigating evidence is essential to obtain a life 
sentence but also, potentially, most deadly.209 
In closing, I want to explore a bridge between the divergent views 
expressed in Wilson, and in Correll and West and the many cases like them, 
by pursuing a question that the Wilson opinions—and the studies they 
cited—did not ask.  In one study using interviews with capital jurors, 
Stephen Garvey reported that certain evidence was found by different jurors 
to be both aggravating and mitigating.210  In another, Professor Garvey 
assessed the role of emotion in capital jurors’ sentencing decisions.  
Identifying a conflict between fear of the defendant and sympathy for the 
defendant based on the facts of the crime, he indirectly pinpointed the 
complexity of explanatory mitigation: “If a juror believed the defendant was 
emotionally unstable or disturbed, he responded with sympathy, just as 
expected.  Yet he also responded with disgust.  Emotionally disturbed 
defendants can thus leave a juror feeling sympathetic and disgusted all at 
once.”211 Findings like Garvey’s could say to a reasonable attorney: Be 
most wary of evidence with a double edge because fear may be more 
powerful than sympathy.  
But whether jurors perceive double-edged life history evidence as 
more mitigating than aggravating or vice versa may depend on more than 
the nature of the evidence.  It may also depend on how the evidence is 
presented.  As useful as the first generation Capital Jury Project interviews 
are, and as insightful as the articles synthesizing the data have been,212 there 
are factors not directly addressed: How thorough a mitigation presentation 
did the jurors hear?  Did the jurors (or mock jurors) whose answers made 
up the data set hear complete or incomplete mitigation presentations?  Did 
the interviewees hear evidence of mental illness or troubled life history as 
part of a coherent and comprehensive narrative? The differences in the 
studies noted by the Wilson majority may turn on more than a blanket 
response by jurors to particular types of information.  It may also have to do 
 
209 Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1096 n.4 (“We acknowledge . . . that there are some conflicting 
studies; additionally, almost all of the studies are based on the same data set, which is now 
over ten years old. . . . [M]ore investigation of this important issue would be useful.”).  
210 See Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases, supra note 18, at 1556-59. 
211 Garvey, supra note 13, at 57-58. 
212 A “second generation” of Capital Jury Project research promises to link jury 
interviews with the relevant trial transcripts in a general effort to learn more about jury 
decisionmaking and, specifically, to investigate the reasons for a national downturn in death 
sentencing.  See William J. Bowers et al., The Capital Jury Experiment of the Supreme 
Court, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY  199, 208-12 (Charles S. Lanier et al., 
eds., 2009); William J. Bowers & Scott E. Sundby, Why the Downturn in Death Sentences?, 
in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 47, 57-62 (Charles S. Lanier et al., eds., 
2009). 
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with jurors’ response to the detail, nuance, and coherence of the 
information.  The studies, therefore, may not be as conflicting as they seem. 
The emphasis on storytelling as a model for understanding jury 
decision-making, and the need for completeness and coherence in the 
investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence that the Death Penalty 
Guidelines call for, already finds support in work based on empirical data, 
including that of the Capital Jury Project, and in other fields, including 
communication and organization theory and linguistic anthropology.213  An 
excellent example is the book A Life and Death Decision, in which Scott 
Sundby recounts the deliberations of a jury in a capital murder case 
deciding whether to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or the death 
penalty.214  Sundby’s account investigates the jury’s deliberative process, 
focusing on how jurors’ different personalities work together and against 
each other.  The book follows its characters, Ken, the Chorus, and Peggy, as 
they travel from an initial 9-3 split to a unanimous decision in favor of 
death.  Sundby’s account is based on interviews with actual jurors and 
draws from the Capital Jury Project databank of interviews from over a 
dozen jurisdictions.  The case of Ken, the Chorus, and Peggy thus serves as 
an illustration of jury dynamics in capital sentencing across jurisdictions 
and in many capital cases.  One of Sundby’s most striking conclusions has 
to do with the death-directing power of categories and lists. 
Lists are innate to capital punishment in the modern era because nearly 
all death penalty statutes follow to some degree an approach to sentencing 
devised by the Model Penal Code, which identifies certain facts about the 
crime as aggravating factors (multiple murder, felony murder) and others 
pertaining to the individual character or circumstances of the capital 
defendant as mitigating factors.215  Once a jury finds these exist, the model 
asks jurors to balance, or “weigh,” the aggravating factors against the 
mitigating factors to decide whether death is the appropriate punishment.  
The Model Penal Code established a framework in which lists, while not 
meant to apply purely quantitatively (as in the number of aggravating 
factors versus the number of mitigating factors), nevertheless provide a 
basis for the jury’s sentencing decision. 
Sundby recognizes from the Capital Jury Project interviews that capital 
juries frequently use lists in their decision-making.  There are two primary 
types.  The first is, understandably, a list of facts “for death” (aggravating 
factors) pitted against a list of facts “for life” (mitigating factors).  The 
 
213 See Blume, supra note 18, at 1051-53; Hans, supra note 18; Sundby, supra note 2,  at 
1178-79. 
214 SCOTT E. SUNDBY, A LIFE AND DEATH DECISION: A JURY WEIGHS THE DEATH 
PENALTY (2005). 
215 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1985). 
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second common list is a chronology of the defendant’s life; in essence 
translating the defendant’s mitigation evidence into a timeline as a means of 
looking for opportunities the defendant had to choose a different life course, 
one that would have led him in a direction away from the murder at which 
he ended up.216  Sundby shows how jurors who favor the death penalty 
often use both types of lists to impress the rationality of their position upon 
jurors who favor life.217  The story of Ken and Peggy illustrates this, as the 
lists are used among other techniques and obfuscations to convince Peggy, 
after two days the lone holdout, that her position is objectively wrong.218 
What Sundby reports about capital jury decision-making dynamics 
reflects what communication, persuasion, and organization theorists have 
long recognized about the comparative, often competing, power of lists and 
stories.  Lists are powerful because, like rules, they present a codified 
knowledge.  “[T]heir legitimacy is based on the belief that technique—a set 
of specific steps—will lead to identifiable, predictable outcomes”219; in 
other words, the belief that there is a right and wrong answer and lists help 
identify the right one.  Lists also allow those who use them to “‘transform 
political discourse to discourse on technique, thus disguising political value 
judgments as rational responses to technical problems in which order, 
justice, equality, and rationality appear to dominate.’”220  Therefore, lists 
are effective tools in bringing about “discipline and in-group identity.”221  
Ken’s position in Sundby’s account follows this theory—he is resilient and 
unwavering in his mission to show Peggy the light, to help her see what is 
“right.”222  Ken seems removed from his stated political preference for the 
death penalty in his effort to bring Peggy back into the fold and help her 
establish that she is normal, not crazy.  It has been asserted that “[t]he 
extent of the power in a list can be difficult for other forms of discourse to 
match.”223  And indeed this is so in Sundby’s account, as Peggy, inclined to 
 
216 SUNDBY, supra note 214, at 50, 141-42; see also Sundby, supra note 2, at 1136. 
217 SUNDBY, supra note 214, at 79, 141-42, 151, 153.  
218 Id. at 50, 79. 
219 See Larry Davis Browning, Lists and Stories as Organizational Communication, 2 
COMM. THEORY 281, 283 (1992). 
220 Id. at 284 (quoting Mark. A. Covaleski & Mark W. Dirsmith, The Use of Budgetary 
Symbols in the Political Arena: An Historically Informed Field Study, 13 ACCT., ORGS. & 
SOC’Y 1, 7 (1988)). 
221 Id. at 284. 
222 SUNDBY, supra note 214, at 25-26; id. at 52-54, 90. 
223 Browning, supra note 219, at 284. 
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eschew stereotype and without clinging to lists of her own, becomes less 
and less convinced of her own views.224 
While Sundby’s account, drawn from the first generation of Capital 
Jury Project data, does not tell of the completeness or coherence of the 
mitigation presentation that Peggy and the other jurors heard, her reaction 
to the evidence nevertheless presents a compelling illustration of the power 
that a story or detailed narrative can have.  It is a different power than lists. 
In Sundby’s account, Peggy was not impressed with lists; she was “curious” 
about and moved by complexity in the defendant’s life.225  Her experience 
illustrates the challenge stories have in competing with lists.  Lists codify 
and centralize, providing a “unitary experience”; stories “are local 
knowledge,” which “allow for accepting the single experience of 
individuals by accepting their points of view.”226  “Stories are important 
because grand plans [(i.e., lists)] account for only a partial 
explanation . . . .”227  Stories present “differences—different points of view, 
different needs, different experiences.”228  The individualized life history—
a detailed and thorough life story—is therefore a natural tool for the capital 
defendant, who is almost always marginalized, often from a marginalized 
socio-economic background, often with mental illness or disorder, and 
always, because of the crime itself, viewed by jurors as dangerously 
different. 
Stories do not lack power, but to have power they must appeal to 
sense.  “Stories must have narrative probability—is the story coherent?—
and narrative fidelity—does the story ring true with the stories known to be 
true in one’s life?”229  As Buselle and Bilandzic explain, a story, regardless 
of how true or false, will suffer from a lack of believability with the listener 
if it lacks coherence in one of these respects.  The narrative of a life history, 
in other words, is not simply a matter of making a certain point and backing 
it up with proof; it is also a matter of aligning the points made.  A narrative 
moves a jury not just by a type or category of evidence and the amount of 
 
224 The contest between Ken, the Chorus, and Peggy in Sundby’s account brings to mind 
the discussion of capital sentencing deliberations and gender in Joan Howarth, Deciding to 
Kill: Revealing the Gender in the Task Handed to Capital Jurors, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1345. 
225 SUNDBY, supra note 214, at 70, 85-86, 115. 
226 Browning, supra note 219, at 289; see id. at 287 (citing JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, 
THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian 
Massumi trans., Minnesota University Press 1984)). 
227 Id. at 289. 
228 Id. at 296. 
229 Id. at 289; see also Rick Buselle & Helena Bilandzic, Fictionality and Perceived 
Realism in Experiencing Stories: A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement, 18 
COMM. THEORY 255, 256 (2008) (referring to these necessary properties of stories as, 
respectively, narrative realism and external realism). 
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proof to support it, but also by the believability—the coherence—and 
therefore the persuasiveness of the story as a whole.230  The more coherent a 
life history presentation is, the more likely it will be viewed as mitigating; 
the less coherent, the more likely it will be perceived as aggravating. 
These points about detail (or completeness) and coherence are more 
than good advice for counsel investigating and preparing a capital 
defense;231 they are a part of how postconviction courts must assess capital 
counsel’s failures and the prejudicial impact of those failures at sentencing 
under Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla.  This tells us something about how 
courts should think about the evidence that trial counsel failed to present.  It 
says that courts should not assess old evidence versus new as though some 
is enough; to do so ignores the difference between a list as Ken made and a 
story that Peggy needed to hear to maintain her vote for life.  It eviscerates 
the power of narrative, which is the capital defendant’s tool under the 
Eighth Amendment, and it defaces the individualized nature of the 
sentencing proceeding.  If double-edged evidence turns aggravating when it 
is presented incompletely, it becomes powerfully mitigating when coherent 
and detailed.  The distorting effect of hindsight when mitigation evidence is 
measured by “some is enough” and “double-edge” mantras is no longer a 
second-guessing of defense counsel’s well-informed choices, but rather an 
obscuring of the defendant’s life into a selection of categories, stereotypes, 
and cookie-cutter soundbytes that strip a life history presentation of its 
power and overlook or severely underestimate the power that new evidence 
could have had on a sentencing juror.  Particularly on a juror more inclined 
to vote for a life sentence.232  A juror like Peggy. 
One can try to parse through the cases to develop patterns of what 
categories of mitigation (mental illness, drug abuse, sexual or physical 
abuse, poverty) courts will find sufficiently mitigating to warrant further 
investigation or a finding of prejudice.  But this misses the crux of the issue.  
Woodson calls for an individualized sentencing determination, unique to the 
defendant.  Boxing the defendant’s mitigation in categories and deciding 
from there whether counsel should have pursued investigation or present 
 
230 See, e.g., Mark Olive & Russell Stetler, Using the Supplementary Guidelines for the 
Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases to Change the Picture in 
Post-Conviction, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1067, 1092 (2008) (“But the larger task of humanizing 
the client, of enabling judges, clemency commissioners, and state executives to feel empathy 
for a death row inmate, takes more than standards, checklists, and practice tips.”). 
231 See the recent law review symposium issue dedicated to the importance of 
storytelling in capital defense litigation.  Symposium, Death Penalty Stories, 77 UMKC L. 
Rev. 831 (2009). 
232 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen P. Garvey, The Merciful Capital Juror, 2 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 165, 184-85 (2004) (referring to such life leaning jurors as “high mercy 
jurors.”). 
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evidence misses the bigger picture of the defendant’s life as a whole.  It 
forgets that compartmentalized accounts are bound to fail to be believable.   
The Burger principle endorsing dismissal of double-edged mitigation 
evidence operates from a myopic view, one that sees mitigation evidence as 
falling into a series of boxes, rather than presenting the dynamic of a 
defendant’s life.  When defense counsel begin to operate with snapshots 
rather than an integrated whole, they lose the completeness and coherence 
of mitigation theory that the Death Penalty Guidelines seek, they begin to 
do the client a disservice because the life story starts to look like a fiction, 
or to look more like a series of isolated character traits or events.  More like 
a list, less like a story.  And with this loss of narrative goes the mitigation 
case’s explanatory value. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The survey conducted here indicates that the federal courts of appeals 
continue to shelter post hoc rationalizations by capital counsel because 
court panels and judges take different views of: (1) what constitutes a 
reasonable investigation of a capital defendant’s life history after Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla; and (2) the value of much mitigating evidence long 
considered fundamental to individualized sentencing.  The most sensible 
reading of the Court’s new precedent, taking into account the Court’s 
distinction of Burger and Darden, is this: If the Burger principles stand they 
must be modified to meet modern professional standards, not those of the 
late 1970s.  This demands that counsel thoroughly investigate a defendant’s 
life history (the good and the bad) before deciding what evidence to present 
or not present to the jury. 
With regard to the perceptual divide, studying how jurors respond to 
explanatory mitigation relative to the completeness and coherence of the 
mitigation presentation is an important next step.  This is significant for 
eradicating strategery because evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
jurors hearing complete and coherent presentations find explanatory 
background evidence more mitigating and less aggravating would render 
the validity of counsel’s claims of judgment about certain evidence directly 
subject to the quality of their investigative work and their presentation to 
the jury.  So rooted in the facts, post hoc rationalizations have little place, if 
any, to hide. 
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS ALLEGING FAILURE 
TO INVESTIGATE OR PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE, 2000–2008 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
 
 Relief 
Granted 
Relief 
Denied Dissent 
Rev’g Panel or 
Lower Court 
1.  West v. Bell,  
550 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2008) 
    
2.  Owens v. Guida,  
549 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2008) 
    
3.  Hawkins v. Coyle,  
547 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2008) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Gant 
4.  Johnson v. Bagley,  
544 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2008) 
    
5.  Mason v. Mitchell,  
543 F.3d 766  (6th Cir. 2008) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Denial 
6.  Jells v. Mitchell,  
538 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2008) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Denial 
7.  Beuke v. Houk,  
537 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2008) 
    
8.  Van Hook v. Anderson,  
535 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2008) 
    
9.  Fautenberry v. Mitchell,  
515 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2008) 
    
10. Brooks v. Bagley,  
513 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2008) 
    
11. Morales v. Mitchell,  
507 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 2007) 
    
12. Getsy v. Mitchell,  
495 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 En Banc  Rev’g 
Panel Grant 
13. Haliym v. Mitchell,  
492 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2007) 
    
14. Hartman v. Bagley,  
492 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007) 
    
15. Durr v. Mitchell,  
487 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2007) 
 
 
    
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 Relief 
Granted 
Relief 
Denied Dissent 
Rev’g Panel or 
Lower Court 
16. Foley v. Parker,  
488 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2007) 
  *  
17. Henley v. Bell,  
487 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2007) 
    
18. Nields v. Bradshaw,  
482 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2007) 
    
19. Keith v. Mitchell,  
466 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2006) 
  Reh’g Denied 
En Banc 
 
20. Williams v. Anderson,  
460 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2006) 
    
21. Poindexter v. Mitchell,  
454 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2006) 
    
22. Keith v. Mitchell,  
455 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2006) 
    
23. Dickerson v. Bagley,  
453 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 2006) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Denial 
24. Slaughter v. Parker,  
450 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2006) 
    
25. Gillard v. Mitchell,  
445 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2006) 
    
26. Carter v. Mitchell,  
443 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2006) 
    
27. Broom v. Mitchell,  
441 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2006) 
    
28. White v. Mitchell,  
431 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2005) 
    
29. Clark v. Mitchell,  
425 F.3d 270 (6th Cir. 2005) 
    
30. Moore v. Parker,  
425 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 2005) 
    
31. Harries v.Bell,  
417 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2005) 
    
32. Payne v. Bell,  
418 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2005) 
    
33. Hill v. Mitchell,  
400 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2005) 
    
34. Hamblin v. Mitchell,  
354 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2003) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Denial 
 
* Dissenting on other grounds. 
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 Relief 
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Relief 
Denied Dissent 
Rev’g Panel or 
Lower Court 
35. Smith v. Mitchell,  
348 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2003) 
    
36. Johnson v. Bell,  
344 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2003) 
    
37. Frazier v. Huffman,  
343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir. 2003) 
    
38. Powell v. Collins,  
332 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 2003) 
    
39. Mason v. Mitchell,  
320 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2003) 
Remand for 
Evid. Hearing
   
40. Wickline v. Mitchell,  
319 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2003) 
    
41. Alley v. Bell,  
307 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2002) 
    
42. Lorraine v. Coyle,  
291 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2002) 
    
43. Cooey v. Coyle,  
289 F.3d 882 (6th Cir. 2002) 
    
44. Martin v. Mitchell,  
280 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2002) 
    
45. Buell v. Mitchell,  
274 F.3d 337 (6th Cir. 2001) 
    
46. Coleman v. Mitchell,  
268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001) 
    
47. Greer v. Mitchell,  
264 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2001) 
Remand for 
Evid. Hearing
   
48. Williams v. Coyle,  
260 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2001) 
    
49. Campbell v. Coyle,  
260 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2001) 
    
50. Skaggs v. Parker,  
235 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 2000) 
    
51. Abdur’Rahman v. Bell,  
226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Grant 
52. Carter v. Bell,  
218 F.3d 581 (6th Cir. 2000) 
    
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U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
 Relief 
Granted 
Relief 
Denied Dissent 
Rev’g Panel or 
Lower Court 
1.  Frogge v. Branker,  
286 Fed. App’x 51 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
2.  Hyde v. Branker,  
286 Fed. App’x 822 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
3.  Strickland v. Branker,  
284 Fed. App’x 57 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
4.  Gray v. Branker,  
529 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
5.  Yarbrough v. Johnson,  
520 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
6.  Cagle v. Branker,  
520 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
7.  Bell v. Kelly,  
260 Fed. App’x 599 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
8.  Bowie v. Branker,  
512 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2008) 
    
9.  Gardner v. Ozmint,  
511 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2007) 
    
10. Meyer v. Branker,  
506 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2007) 
    
11. Wilkinson v. Polk,  
227 Fed. App’x 210 (4th Cir. 2007) 
    
12. McNeill v. Polk,  
476 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2007) 
  *  
13. Emmett v. Kelly,  
474 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2007) 
    
14. Buckner v. Polk,  
466 F.3d 280 (4th Cir. 2006)
(denying reh’g en banc), aff’g, 453
F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2006) 
    
     
 
* Dissenting on other grounds. 
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 Relief 
Granted 
Relief 
Denied Dissent 
Rev’g Panel or 
Lower Court 
15. Campbell v. Polk,  
447 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2006) 
    
16. Hedrick v. True,  
443 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2006) 
    
17. Vinson v. True,  
436 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2006) 
    
18. Moody v.Polk,  
408 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2005) 
    
19. Lovitt v. True,  
403 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2005) 
    
20. Walker v.True,  
401 F.3d 574 (4th Cir. 2005) 
    
21. McHone v. Polk,  
392 F.3d 691(4th Cir. 2004) 
    
22. Syriani v. Polk,  
118 Fed. App’x 706 (4th Cir. 2004) 
    
23. Kandies v. Polk,  
385 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2004) 
    
24. United States v. Roane,  
378 F.3d 382 (4th Cir. 2004) 
    
25. Richmond v. Polk,  
375 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2004) 
    
26. Bailey v. True,  
100 Fed. App’x 128 (4th Cir. 2004) 
    
27. Wilson v. Ozmint,  
352 F.3d 847 (4th Cir. 2003) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Grant 
28. Orbe v. True,  
82 Fed. App’x 802 (4th Cir. 2003) 
    
29. Tucker v. Ozmint,  
350 F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2003) 
    
30. Byram v. Ozmint,  
339 F.3d 203 (4th Cir. 2003) 
    
31. Brown v. Lee,  
319 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 2003) 
    
32. Bramblett v. True,  
59 Fed. App’x 1 (4th Cir. 2003) 
    
33. Hunt v. Lee,  
291 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2002) 
    
34. Basden v. Lee,  
290 F.3d 602 (4th Cir. 2002) 
    
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 Relief 
Granted 
Relief 
Denied Dissent 
Rev’g Panel or 
Lower Court 
35. Wiggins v. Corcoran,  
288 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2002) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Grant 
36. Burch v. Corcoran,  
273 F.3d 577 (4th Cir. 2001) 
    
37. Jones v. Catoe,  
9 Fed. App’x 245 (4th Cir. 2001) 
    
38. Rose v. Lee,  
252 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2001) 
   Rev’g 
DCT Grant 
39. Frye v. Lee,  
235 F.3d 897 (4th Cir. 2000) 
    
40. White v. Lee,  
238 F.3d 418 (Table) (4th Cir. 2000)
    
41. Bacon v. Lee,  
225 F.3d 470 (4th Cir. 2000) 
    
42. Grandison v. Corcoran,  
225 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2000) 
    
43. Baker v. Corcoran,  
220 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2000) 
    
44. Oken v. Corcoran,  
220 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2000) 
    
45. Fisher v. Lee,  
215 F.3d 438 (4th Cir. 2000) 
    
 
 
 
